4 Corruption as an Equilibrium: Norms and Collective Action

Lecture

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Reading

Persson, Anna, Bo Rothstein, and Jan Teorell (2013). “Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem.” Governance, 26(3), 449–471. (PDF) Required. Presentation by Chris C. D. — Thu, Aug 27.

Corbacho, Ana, Daniel W. Gingerich, Virginia Oliveros, and Mauricio Ruiz-Vega (2016). “Corruption as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Costa Rica.” American Journal of Political Science, 60(4), 1077–1092. (PDF) Required.

Fisman, Raymond, and Edward Miguel (2007). “Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets.” Journal of Political Economy, 115(6), 1020–1048. (PDF) Recommended. Presentation by Nicole B. M. — Thu, Aug 27.

Rothstein, Bo (2011). The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective. University of Chicago Press. Read Chapter 7, “The Low Trust–Corruption–Inequality Trap” (Chapter 8, “Quality of Government and Social Trust: Two Experiments,” optional). (PDF) Recommended. Presentation by Santiago C. A. — Thu, Aug 27.