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flowchart LR
M["The mayor<br/>wants permits<br/>issued fairly"]
C["The clerk<br/>handles the<br/>application"]
B["The citizen<br/>pays a bribe"]
M -- "hands over<br/>the job" --> C
C -- "quietly<br/>asks" --> B
style M fill:#e4ece9,stroke:#4a7c6f,stroke-width:2.5px
style C fill:#eef2f4,stroke:#334155,stroke-width:2px
style B fill:#f5e1da,stroke:#b44527,stroke-width:2.5px
The Politics of Corruption
Lecture 4: Corruption as an Equilibrium: Norms and Collective Action
Almost Nobody Defends Corruption
- Anticorruption is one of politics’ rare universal slogans
- Governments around the world routinely promise to fight it
- Laws, agencies, audits and treaties have multiplied
- Yet corruption often survives repeated reform campaigns
Photo: India Against Corruption protest, Bangalore, 22 August 2011. Rajeshodayanchal, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons.
Condemnation Is Not the Missing Ingredient
The Puzzle, and Today’s Route
- People say corruption is wrong — and then take part anyway
- That looks like hypocrisy, but it may not be
- Perhaps behaviour follows what we expect others to do
Three questions today:
- Why do people join in corruption they dislike?
- What evidence shows expectations really matter?
- What kind of reform could change those expectations?
I. Everyone Condemns It — So Why Join In?
Joseph Keppler, The Bosses of the Senate, Puck, 1889. Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.
Exercise 1 — The Clerk’s Window
5 minutes. Hands up each round, then discuss.
You need a permit. The clerk hints that a small payment speeds things up.
Round 1. Everyone ahead of you paid. Do you pay?
Round 2. Nobody ahead of you paid. Do you pay?
Then: between rounds, did your morals change — or your expectations?
Story A: One Dishonest Clerk
- The mayor wants permits issued fairly and quickly
- One clerk quietly asks applicants for a payment
- The mayor cannot see what happens at the window
- Nobody else in the office is doing this
Ask yourself: what exactly is the problem here?
Story B: The Whole Office Expects It
- Every clerk expects a payment; every applicant expects to pay
- The supervisor takes a share of what is collected
- Reporting it means reporting to someone already involved
- Refusing to pay means simply not getting the permit
Ask yourself: is this still one badly supervised clerk?
Two Names for Two Problems
| Story A | Story B | |
|---|---|---|
| What goes wrong | One person hides bad behaviour | Everyone expects everyone else to cheat |
| Who can fix it | The boss, by watching more closely | Nobody acting alone |
| Honest people are | The normal case | Punished as fools |
| Political scientists call it | A principal–agent problem | A collective-action problem |
Story A, Drawn
The mayor cannot easily see what happens at the window. Author’s illustration of the principal–agent account (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1978).
The Usual Solution
- Find the official who is taking money
- Watch that official more closely
- Raise the punishment if they are caught
This is the standard anticorruption toolkit, and it can work — when someone at the top genuinely wants the rules enforced.
Klitgaard (1988) summarises it as monopoly plus discretion minus accountability.
Two Rooms, Two Outcomes
What the Two Rooms Show
- In Room A, paying is what a sensible person does
- In Room B, refusing is what a sensible person does
- The person did not change — the room did
- Each room holds itself in place once it exists
A situation that keeps itself going like this is called an equilibrium.
Why a Bigger Fine May Change Nothing
- Yesterday the fine for paying a bribe was 500 euros
- Today the government raises it to 700 euros
- But the police still take money to look away
- Prosecutors still drop the cases that reach them
So ask: for someone standing at the clerk’s window in Room A, has anything actually changed?
Who Will Punish the Punishers?
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flowchart LR
E["I expect others<br/>to be corrupt"]
N["So I pay,<br/>or stay quiet"]
V["Corruption stays<br/>visible and normal"]
E --> N --> V
V -- "which proves me right" --> E
style E fill:#f5e1da,stroke:#b44527,stroke-width:2.5px
style N fill:#eef2f4,stroke:#334155,stroke-width:2px
style V fill:#f5e1da,stroke:#b44527,stroke-width:2.5px
Reporting is risky when the person receiving the report may be involved too. Author’s illustration of the argument in Persson, Rothstein & Teorell (2013).
Evidence from Kenya and Uganda
You report to someone who has already been bribed. And then it ends there.
John Githongo was Kenya’s anticorruption chief, working out of the president’s office. Taking the job seriously cost him his protection, and he left the country in 2006.
When the designated enforcer has to flee, there is no enforcer left.
Interview study with 60+ Kenyan and Ugandan officials, journalists and NGO staff: Persson, Rothstein & Teorell (2013).
So What?
- Story A and Story B are not rival opinions about one world
- They are different worlds, and they need different repairs
- Which one you are in depends on what people expect
- So far, though, this is only a plausible story
Next: can we actually show that expectations change behaviour?
II. Do Expectations Really Change Behaviour?
Charles Grignion after William Hogarth, Canvassing for Votes, 1757. Metropolitan Museum of Art, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons.
How Can We Separate Rules from Norms?
- People from corrupt countries also face weaker enforcement at home
- So comparing countries cannot tell us which one matters
- We would need people from many countries under identical rules
- And a moment when the rules change but the people do not
Fisman and Miguel (2007) found a place where both were true.
Diplomatic Immunity as a Natural Test
- Around 1,700 UN diplomats from 149 countries
- Nearly all missions sit within a mile of UN headquarters
- Same city, same streets, same parking signs
- Before Nov 2002, an unpaid ticket cost them nothing
- So how they parked revealed what they had brought with them
Design from Fisman & Miguel (2007). Photo: Ivan Radic, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons.
The Test in One Picture
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flowchart LR
D["UN diplomats<br/>149 countries,<br/>one Manhattan<br/>neighbourhood"]
I["1997–2002<br/>immunity means<br/>no penalty"]
N["Parking reveals<br/>what they brought<br/>from home"]
L["Nov 2002<br/>city may seize<br/>diplomatic plates"]
F["Parking reveals<br/>what enforcement<br/>can do"]
D --> I --> N
D --> L --> F
style D fill:#eef2f4,stroke:#334155,stroke-width:2px
style I fill:#f5e1da,stroke:#b44527,stroke-width:2px
style N fill:#f5e1da,stroke:#b44527,stroke-width:2.5px
style L fill:#e4ece9,stroke:#4a7c6f,stroke-width:2px
style F fill:#e4ece9,stroke:#4a7c6f,stroke-width:2.5px
Author’s illustration of the research design in Fisman & Miguel (2007).
When Nobody Was Watching
What the Comparison Can and Cannot Show
- The pattern is real, but it is not perfect
- Kuwait, the very worst violator, scored as relatively clean
- Small missions own few cars, so they park badly less often
- The researchers therefore compared countries adjusting for mission size
On that comparison, moving from Nigeria’s score to Norway’s implies roughly an 80% drop in violations.
Then Enforcement Arrived
What the Diplomats Teach Us
- With no penalty, people acted on expectations brought from home
- So what people have learned to expect really does travel
- When a real consequence appeared, behaviour changed within months
So does enforcement beat norms? No — norms governed behaviour precisely while nobody was enforcing anything. Both matter, and enforcement has to be believable.
Does Believing It Is Spreading Make People Bribe?
- The question: does hearing that corruption is rising make people join in?
- The test: 4,200 people interviewed across Costa Rica’s main urban area
- Some, chosen at random, were shown a flyer reporting rising corruption
- Everyone was then asked whether they would bribe a traffic officer
Because the flyer was assigned by chance, any difference is caused by the information.
Corbacho, Gingerich, Oliveros & Ruiz-Vega (2016).
Believing Corruption Is Rising Makes People Bribe
So What?
- Diplomats acted on expectations even where no rule was enforced
- Costa Ricans bribed more once told that others were bribing
- Expectations are not just talk: they move real behaviour
- And expectations can make themselves come true
Next: if expectations are the problem, what should reform actually target?
III. What Does This Mean for Reform?
Why strong laws so often sit on paper — and what would have to change.
Why Anticorruption Agencies Disappoint
- The new agency is staffed from the same society it polices
- Reporting a colleague is risky when the recipient may be involved
- The whistleblower pays the price; everyone else shares the gain
- Kenya and Uganda scored 100/100 on anticorruption laws
- Yet the gap between law and practice was rated “large” and “huge”
The toolkit is not wrong. It quietly assumes the very thing that is missing.
Global Integrity (2008), as reported in Persson, Rothstein & Teorell (2013).
What Would Actually Change Expectations?
- A larger fine on paper changes little if nobody enforces it
- Reform has to be visible: people must see the rules bite
- And credible: reporting, prosecution and staffing must change together
- One prosecuted minister teaches more than ten new statutes
Rothstein argues that trust, corruption and inequality hold each other in place — which is why he doubts that small, separate fixes can break the pattern.
Rothstein (2011); Persson, Rothstein & Teorell (2013).
Exercise 2 — Which Reform Would Work?
5 minutes. In pairs: 3 minutes to choose, 2 minutes to defend.
A city has strong anticorruption laws, corrupt police, citizens who assume everyone pays, and reports that go nowhere.
- Raise the official fine for bribery
- Launch another public anticorruption campaign
- Build a reporting channel that works, and visibly punish several powerful people
- Ask citizens to sign an honesty pledge
Which one changes what people expect others to do?
Which Situation Are You In?
| Ask this | Points to Story A | Points to Story B |
|---|---|---|
| Do most people expect others to pay? | No | Yes |
| Is corruption punished when exposed? | Sometimes | Rarely |
| Do honest officials pay a social price? | No | Yes |
| Does anyone with power want enforcement? | Yes | No |
| Sensible first move | Audits and closer supervision | Visible, coordinated overhaul |
Takeaways
Why does corruption survive near-universal disapproval?
Because people act on what they expect others to do — not only on what they personally believe is right.
Before backing any reform, ask three questions:
- Is this one official escaping supervision, or does everyone expect the worst?
- Is there anyone with power who actually wants the rules enforced?
- Will people see that something has changed?
A law changes behaviour only when people believe it will be enforced.
Coming up: Week 9 looks at clientelism as another self-sustaining pattern; Week 15 asks what it takes to break one.
References
Afrobarometer. (2006). Afrobarometer Round 3 survey data. Afrobarometer Network. (As reported in Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013.)
Corbacho, A., Gingerich, D. W., Oliveros, V., & Ruiz-Vega, M. (2016). Corruption as a self-fulfilling prophecy: Evidence from a survey experiment in Costa Rica. American Journal of Political Science, 60(4), 1077–1092. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12244
Fisman, R., & Miguel, E. (2007). Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: Evidence from diplomatic parking tickets. Journal of Political Economy, 115(6), 1020–1048. https://doi.org/10.1086/527495
Global Integrity. (2008). Global Integrity report 2008. Global Integrity.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2005). Governance matters IV: Governance indicators for 1996–2004 (Policy Research Working Paper No. 3630). World Bank.
Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling corruption. University of California Press.
References (continued)
Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013). Why anticorruption reforms fail—Systemic corruption as a collective action problem. Governance, 26(3), 449–471. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01604.x
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978). Corruption: A study in political economy. Academic Press.
Rothstein, B. (2011). The quality of government: Corruption, social trust, and inequality in international perspective. University of Chicago Press.
Popescu (TEC) Politics of Corruption Lecture 4: Corruption as an Equilibrium: Norms and Collective Action