Diversity in a Globalized World

Lecture 1: Who Paid for Globalization?

Bogdan G. Popescu

Tecnológico de Monterrey

The Course

What this course is about

A globalized world: trade, money and migration tie distant places together.

Diversity: the same process lands very differently.

  • Places: some gained from trade, others lost their factories
  • Politics: some regions turned to populists, others did not
  • People: some leave home, and send money to those who stay
  • Neighbourhoods: some groups live side by side, others apart

An average hides all four. This week we look for them in the data.

The week

Day Session Question
Monday The China Shock and AI Who paid for globalization?
Tuesday Populism and Democratic Erosion What did those losses do to politics?
Wednesday Migration — optional Why do people leave, and what follows them back?
Thursday Segregation Do different people ever actually meet?
Friday Final Presentations What did your team find?

Wednesday 16 September is Independence Day, so that session is optional.

A second course, about evidence

Every day, the same habit: ask what the evidence actually shows.

  • Monday: a map reveals what a national average hides
  • Tuesday: one wave of populism, four competing explanations
  • Wednesday: one event, two economists, opposite conclusions
  • Thursday: change the unit you measure, and the answer changes

By Friday you will have built one of these arguments yourself.

Optional: the R you need

No background in economics, statistics or programming is required, and you can make your figures in Excel or Tableau. R is recommended. If you choose it, work through these decks from my research workshop: they teach enough R to make maps and graphs, and nothing beyond that.

Evening Workshop decks What they give your report
Monday Lecture 2: Essential Tools for Writing a Paper
Lecture 3: Operations and Objects in R
R, RStudio and Quarto installed; the basics of R
Tuesday Lecture 6: Working with Data in R
Lecture 7: Dplyr and Basic Visualization
Loading the data, and your first graph
Wednesday Lecture 13: Data Visualization in R 1
Lecture 14: Data Visualization in R 2
Maps and colour scales
Thursday Lecture 15: Data Visualization in R 3 Facets: how the simple graph becomes the complex one

Links are on each session page. The workshop’s statistics and regression decks are not part of this course.

What you will be able to do

  • Describe where globalization’s costs landed, and why averages mislead
  • Explain economic and cultural accounts of the populist backlash
  • Explain why people migrate, and what the evidence says about wages
  • Measure how segregated a city is, and why the unit matters
  • Read a claim critically — rival explanations, and what data cannot show
  • Produce a short report with maps and graphs, in any tool

Logistics

  • When: Monday to Friday, 13:10–15:50 · Where: Aulas 11201
  • Instructor: Bogdan Popescu · bgpopescu@tec.mx · office hours by appointment
  • Course site: bgpopescu.net/teaching/diversity, one page per session
  • Reading: one article per session, read together in class
  • Software: Excel, Tableau or, ideally, R

How you are graded

Component Weight
Team report 40%
Final presentation 25%
Reading quiz, Friday 25%
Contributions to class 10%

Contributions to class — the average of:

  • Attendance
  • Participation in the in-class exercises
  • Progress on your report

Your report mark is adjusted by your team member evaluation.

The team report

Teams of three. One report, made with any tool, containing:

  • Two to three maps
  • One simple graph and one more complex graph
  • An interpretation in your own words
  • A table declaring your use of AI

Due Friday at 13:10, the start of the final session. Submit a PDF of the report and the file you made the figures in, on Canvas.

Where the report marks are

Points Full marks means
The question 6 one specific question, answerable with your data
The figures 10 titled, labelled, sourced, readable
The interpretation 12 you say what each figure shows, in your own words
What you cannot say 8 who is counted, which unit, one rival explanation
AI and working file 4 declaration complete, file opens and runs

Half the marks are the two bold rows. Good figures with nothing said about them do not pass.

Worked examples

Three finished reports built from this course’s data, made in R. Copy the structure in any tool.

You may take the structure. The question, the choice of variables and the interpretation have to be yours.

The final presentation

Friday. Ten minutes per team, plus questions. Follow your report:

  1. The question — one sentence
  2. The maps — where the dark areas are, and what that means
  3. The graph — the relationship you found
  4. What you cannot say — the limitation that most threatens your conclusion
  5. One thing that surprised you

Show your figures and talk about them. Do not read from the slide.

Where the presentation marks are

Points Full marks means
The question 4 one sentence, at the start
The figures, explained 7 you talk the room through a figure
What you cannot say 5 the limitation that threatens your conclusion
Answering questions 7 whoever made a choice can explain it
Time and teamwork 2 ten minutes, everyone speaks

The biggest single row is answering questions — including where AI helped, and how you checked it.

Use of AI

You may use AI, such as ChatGPT. You must declare it.

Every report ends with a short table: what you used it for, what you asked, and how you checked the answer.

  • Never submit work you cannot explain — you will be asked
  • Use AI for the mechanical parts, not the judgement

Fixing an error message is a good use. Deciding your question, or what your map means, is not.

So what?

  • The report is 40% of your grade, due Friday at 13:10
  • Today’s graphs and maps use the data you will receive

So watch how each argument is built, not only what it concludes. It is the model for your report.

Today: Who Paid for Globalization?

Two numbers

  • Trade with China made almost everything in this room cheaper
  • It also destroyed manufacturing jobs in particular towns

Both are true. Only one of them shows up in a national average.

Today: how you find the second one, and whether AI is doing the same thing again.

Today’s objectives

  • Describe where the China shock landed and how concentrated it was
  • Explain what happened to workers in the places it hit
  • Trace how the same shock reached Mexico, through the US market
  • Compare a shock that follows local industry with one that does not
  • Say what each dataset can and cannot show

What happened

  • China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001
  • Its manufactured exports rose faster than any country’s in history
  • American factories competed with them, and many lost

That is the story everyone knows. The interesting question is where it landed, because it did not land evenly.

The scale of it

An enormous container terminal with rows of stacked shipping containers and gantry cranes.

Yangshan deep-water port, Shanghai. Source: Wikimedia Commons, public domain.

How we measure the shock?

The basic idea is simple:

Which places were most exposed to competition from Chinese imports?

Imagine two towns:

  • Town A makes furniture, toys, and clothing — products China began exporting much more of.
  • Town B is mostly hospitals, restaurants, and local services — things that are not imported from China.

Town A gets a high import-exposure score.
Town B gets a low one.

How we measure the shock?

The measure asks:

How much did Chinese imports rise in the industries that workers in this local area depended on?

It then divides that increase by the number of workers in the area.

So import exposure is roughly:

more Chinese imports in your local industries ÷ local workers

A larger number means a bigger trade shock.

How we measure the shock?

  • The United States is divided into 722 commuting zones — local labour markets where people live and work.
  • Each zone gets its own import-exposure score.
  • The study compares two periods: 1990–2000 and 2000–2007.

The key point: the China shock was not equally large everywhere.
It depended on what your local economy produced before Chinese imports surged.

What the score actually is

That score has a unit: dollars of Chinese imports per local worker.

A zone scoring $2,640 means:

For every worker living there, an extra $2,640 of Chinese goods were arriving each year, in the industries that zone worked in.

A zone of 100,000 workers scoring $2,640 faced about $264 million a year of new Chinese competition in its own industries.

What the score is not

  • It is not a pay cut. Nobody handed over $2,640
  • It is not money the zone lost
  • It is the size of the wave arriving, divided by the number of people standing in it

Dividing by workers is what makes a small town and a big city comparable. Detroit gets more imports than a mill town simply because Detroit is bigger — per worker, we can ask which one was hit harder.

Where the China shock hit hardest

The shock was not evenly spread across the United States.

Some local economies depended heavily on industries that suddenly faced much more competition from Chinese imports.

Other places depended on industries that were barely affected.

Where it landed

Figure 1

Where it landed

So when you look at the map, read it like this:

  • Darker / higher-exposure areas = places whose existing industries faced a larger increase in Chinese import competition.
  • Lighter / lower-exposure areas = places whose local industries faced much less of that competition.

This does not mean that China “targeted” those places.

It means those places were more vulnerable because of what they were already producing.

A few places took most of it

Extra Chinese imports arriving each year by 2007, per local worker:

  • The average zone: $2,640
  • The hardest-hit zone: $43,000 — more than 16 times the average
  • The middle zone: $1,900 — almost two in three zones came in below the average

The average sits above the typical place and far below the places that actually took the hit. It describes almost nobody.

A few places took most of it

Figure 2

Those 72 red bars absorbed a third of the country’s entire shock.

A few places took most of it

Where the red bars are:

  • Two-thirds of the worst-hit zones are in the South
  • Most of the rest are in the Midwest
  • Only 2 of 72 are in the West

So this was not one shock the country shared. It was a small number of places taking a very large hit.

So what?

  • A national average hides where a shock actually lands
  • The unit you choose decides what you can see
  • Commuting zones show it; states would not

Which raises the real question: what happened to the people who lived there?

II. What It Did to Those Places

What decline looks like

A vast derelict multi-storey factory building with smashed windows and vegetation growing through it.

The abandoned Packard plant, Detroit. Source: Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0, Albert duce.

More exposure, fewer factory jobs

Figure 3

This plot is descriptive. The paper behind it uses a stronger research design to isolate Chinese competition — we are not learning that method today.

The relationship got stronger

Figure 4

Two ways to read the same loss

Figure 5

Why the two panels disagree

  • Men started with 14.9% of the population in manufacturing; women 7.2%
  • Both lost roughly the same number of percentage points
  • Relative to what each group had, women lost twice as much

Exercise 1 — Make a prediction

Your town’s only factory closes. You are forty, and you worked there.

Rank these four, from most to least common:

  1. Move to another city
  2. Find other work nearby
  3. Become unemployed
  4. Stop looking for work

If your ranking is right, what should the data show?

Example: if people move, hard-hit places should be losing population. Five minutes, in pairs.

What happened in more-exposed places

Figure 6

The mechanism

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flowchart LR
  A["Imports<br/>arrive"] --> B["The plant<br/>closes"]
  B --> C["A new job<br/>nearby"]
  B --> D["Move to<br/>another city"]
  B --> E["Stop looking<br/>for work"]
  C --> F["Adjustment<br/>works"]
  D --> F
  E --> G["Adjustment<br/>fails"]
Figure 7

Author’s illustration, after Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013). The data points to the bottom path.

So what?

  • Unemployment and labour-force exit rose about equally in hit places
  • Neither moving away nor new local jobs absorbed the loss
  • A place can lose its economy and keep its population

Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Majlesi (2020) followed those same places into politics. That is Lecture 2.

And the United States was not the only country in this story. Mexico was selling to the same customer.

III. The Same Shock, Seen from Mexico

Mexico was selling to the same customer

  • NAFTA (1994) tied Mexican factories to the US market
  • Maquiladoras assembled clothes, televisions and car parts for export
  • After 2001, Chinese factories sold into that same market

So Mexico’s shock did not arrive as cheap imports at home. It arrived as orders that went somewhere else.

2003: the year China passed Mexico

Figure 8

Mexico passed China again in 2023. Why is a question for another course.

What happened inside Mexico

  • Maquiladora employment and growth fell (Utar & Torres Ruiz 2013)
  • The least skilled plants were hit hardest
  • Exposed regions lost manufacturing employment (Méndez 2015)
  • The loss was larger where they competed with China in the US

Wages barely moved. What changed was where people worked — and more of them moved between regions.

Where manufacturing employment changed in Mexico

This is a descriptive approximation of the pattern discussed by Méndez (2015).

Where did manufacturing employment actually grow or shrink between 1998 and 2008?

Where manufacturing employment changed in Mexico

Figure 9

Where manufacturing employment changed in Mexico

The map should be read carefully:

  • Red states lost manufacturing jobs between 1998 and 2008.
  • Green states gained manufacturing jobs.
  • Only four states lost jobs; the country gained 12%.
  • This does not by itself show that Chinese competition caused the change.

Growth can slow without reversing

Mexico gained manufacturing jobs overall. Exposed regions still lost out.

A shock can hold growth below what it would otherwise have been, and employment still rises.

The map shows what happened. Méndez compares exposed regions with less exposed ones, which is closer to what would have happened otherwise. Those are different questions, and only the second one is about China.

So what?

  • The same measure travels: exposure follows what a place produced
  • Mexico was hit through a third market, not at home
  • And workers moved — remember that on Wednesday

Now: is the next shock going to look the same?

AI is not a factory

The China shock AI
Arrives as a factory closing a website opening
Reaches towns that made those goods anyone with a connection
Exposure depends on what your town produced what you ask it to do

Town A never chose furniture imports. Everyone chooses what to type into a chatbot.

The question changes

For the China shock we asked: where did it land?

Trade exposure followed the industries a place already had. AI is not tied to local industry in the same way.

What do people do with it once they have it?

The data

Most research on AI guesses which jobs a machine could do. This data records what people actually asked it for.

Millions of real conversations with Claude, stripped of anything identifying, each one labelled twice:

  • What for? — work, study, or something personal
  • How? — hand over the whole task, or work alongside it

121 countries · May 2026 · one row is one country

Where the world’s AI use comes from

Figure 10

Where it is used for schoolwork

Figure 11

Almost the opposite map

  • The United States is 20% of world use; 9% of it is coursework
  • Tunisia is 0.3% of world use; 52% of it is coursework
  • Mexico: 1.3% of world use, coursework 21%

The same tool, the same interface — and a completely different place in people’s lives.

Exercise 2 — Can you say this?

52% of Tunisian AI use is coursework — the highest share in the world.

Which of these sentences does that number support?

  1. Most Tunisians use AI for schoolwork.
  2. Most Tunisian conversations with Claude are schoolwork.
  3. Tunisians use AI for school more than Americans do.

Mark each one yes or no. Rewrite the ones that fail.

Five minutes, in pairs.

The trap in that number

  • 1. No — it counts conversations, not people, and only Claude’s
  • 2. Yes — that is exactly what the 52% says
  • 3. Careful — a bigger share of a much smaller amount

Americans send 13 times more coursework to Claude than Tunisians do.

The trap in that number

  • Claude users in Tunisia are young, urban, connected — not a cross-section
  • The China shock counted every worker in a place
  • Here the denominator is whoever showed up

Who is counted is the first question to ask of any dataset.

So what?

  • Trade exposure was fixed by a place’s existing industries
  • AI exposure looks more diffuse — harder to pin to a map
  • Use still varies by place, and how it is used varies more
  • And we see users, not populations

So the hard questions move from where it lands to who uses it, and how.

Which leaves one question: are these two things even the same kind of event?

V. Two Shocks, Two Shapes

They are not the same shape

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flowchart LR
  A["Trade<br/>shock"] --> B["Follows local<br/>industry"]
  B --> C["You can<br/>map exposure"]
  D["AI"] --> E["Not tied to<br/>local industry"]
  E --> F["You must ask<br/>who uses it, and how"]
Figure 12

Author’s illustration. Different shapes need different evidence.

What each dataset can show you

China shock AI
One row is A local labour market A country
Who is counted Every worker there Only people who use the tool
Good for Where it landed, what followed What it is used for
Cannot show Whether trade alone caused it Anything about non-users

What we can say

  • Import exposure and factory job loss move together, strongly
  • The relationship is far stronger after 2001 than before
  • Hard-hit places lost workers from the labour force, not to other cities

Our plots are correlations. The paper is not. Autor, Dorn and Hanson isolate the Chinese side of the shock by using the same industries’ exports to other rich countries — which is why economists read this as cause, not coincidence.

Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2016) review how well it held up.

What we cannot say

  • That trade alone caused it — automation was happening too
  • That the same towns would have thrived otherwise
  • That AI will repeat it: different shape, different data, no outcomes yet

Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) find robots displacing the same kind of work in the same years. The honest position is that we know a great deal about the first shock and almost nothing yet about the second.

Takeaways

  1. Globalization’s gains were spread; its losses were concentrated
  2. The unit you measure decides what you can see
  3. Denominators decide headlines — ask who is counted
  4. Hard-hit places did not empty out; they stopped working
  5. AI is a different shape of shock, and it is early

A national average is a sentence about nobody.

References

Acemoglu, D., & Restrepo, P. (2020). Robots and jobs: Evidence from US labor markets. Journal of Political Economy, 128(6), 2188–2244.

Anthropic. (2026). Anthropic Economic Index, release of 26 June 2026. https://huggingface.co/datasets/Anthropic/EconomicIndex

Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. H. (2013). The China syndrome: Local labor market effects of import competition in the United States. American Economic Review, 103(6), 2121–2168.

References (cont.)

Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. H. (2016). The China shock: Learning from labor-market adjustment to large changes in trade. Annual Review of Economics, 8, 205–240.

Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., Hanson, G. H., & Majlesi, K. (2020). Importing political polarization? The electoral consequences of rising trade exposure. American Economic Review, 110(10), 3139–3183.

Pierce, J. R., & Schott, P. K. (2016). The surprisingly swift decline of US manufacturing employment. American Economic Review, 106(7), 1632–1662.

References (cont.)

Méndez, O. (2015). The effect of Chinese import competition on Mexican local labor markets. The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 34, 364–380.

US Census Bureau. (2026). Trade in goods by country. https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/

Utar, H., & Torres Ruiz, L. B. (2013). International competition and industrial evolution: Evidence from the impact of Chinese competition on Mexican maquiladoras. Journal of Development Economics, 105, 267–287.