Lecture 4: Who Lives Next to Whom
Knowing who lives in a country is not the same as knowing who lives next to whom.
The first two are not the same question. Of the 23.2 million who identify as indigenous, seven in ten do not speak an indigenous language.
The country is diverse. Most of the places in it are not.
Figure 1
The dark municipios are the 371. Oaxaca alone holds 203 of them.
Say where difference sits in Mexico, and separate three questions people run together:
Turn “this city is divided” into a number — and say what that number leaves out
Explain how a city can divide itself with nobody intending it, and why the sorting outlives whatever started it
Say whether living closer together actually reduces prejudice, and under what conditions
Figure 2
Figure 3
Source: INEGI, Perfil sociodemográfico de la población afrodescendiente en México (Censo 2020).
Both cities have 100 residents: 25 blue and 75 green.
Figure 4
Same composition. Different segregation.
| The question | What we learn | |
|---|---|---|
| Composition | Who lives in each place? | A municipio is 30% indigenous-speaking |
| Geographic distribution | Where are groups located? | Which municipios have the highest shares of indigenous-language speakers |
| Segregation | Do groups live in the same neighbourhoods? | Our maps cannot tell us |
Our maps show who lives where across municipios.
They do not show whether indigenous-language speakers and non-speakers live together or apart within a municipio.
To answer that question, we need smaller geographical units.
Which raises the question of whether where you live also shapes how you live.
Figure 5
Geography, history and discrimination all predict the same map. A correlation cannot separate them — which is why the rest of the lecture takes the mechanisms one at a time.
Does this graph prove that indigenous-language speakers are poorer than non-speakers living in the same municipio?
Imagine a municipio where: - 80% speak an indigenous language - 60% live in poverty
The poverty rate could be 60% for both groups.
Our graph tells us which municipios are poor, not which people within them are poor.
This is the ecological fallacy: assuming that a relationship between places also holds between individuals.
Hypothetical example: two municipios, 100 residents each.
Who lives where?
Who is poor within each municipio?
Hypothetical example: 100 residents in each municipio.
| Municipio A | Municipio B | |
|---|---|---|
| Indigenous-language speakers | 20 | 80 |
| Spanish-only speakers | 80 | 20 |
| Indigenous-language speakers in poverty | 7 (35%) | 52 (65%) |
| Spanish-only speakers in poverty | 28 (35%) | 13 (65%) |
| Total in poverty | 35 (35%) | 65 (65%) |
Between municipios: More indigenous-language speakers, more poverty.
Within each municipio: Both groups have the same poverty rate.
Ecological fallacy: Assuming that a relationship between places also holds between individuals within those places.
So let us take one city apart.
Same question, different cleavage: this metro is only 0.4% to 4% indigenous-speaking, so the difference you can see inside it is class.
Figure 8
Figure 9
The index of dissimilarity asks one question: what share of one group would have to move for the two groups to be spread evenly across the city?
Figure 10
Both sit near the left end. A five-fold gap between two municipios is not yet a divided city.
Two cities, four neighbourhoods. Same 200 blue and 200 green in each.
Figure 11
\[D \;=\; \tfrac{1}{2}\sum_{i}\left|\;\frac{b_i}{B}-\frac{g_i}{G}\;\right|\]
City 1 · ½(0.3 + 0.1 + 0.1 + 0.3) = 0.40 — 40% of blue would have to move
City 2 · ½(0.5 + 0.1 + 0.1 + 0.5) = 0.60 — 60% would
Figure 12
No. Every large metro has a gap like this.
But read it carefully: this is a gap between municipios. It says the groups are sorted. It does not say how mixed any one of them is — that is the third word.
In the Valle de México the gap runs from 8% to 76%. Monterrey’s runs from 5% to 28%. Tijuana’s is only 10 points wide.
But these compare municipios, and Monterrey municipio alone holds over a million people.
Real segregation happens street by street. Every number here is a floor, not a ceiling. Say so when you report one.
You have met this problem all week: Monday’s commuting zones, Wednesday’s whole-city comparison for Mariel. Each time, the unit decided what you could see.
You want to know whether your own city is segregated.
What is the smallest unit you could get data for, and why does that choice change your answer?
Then: name one thing your measure would still miss entirely.
Five minutes, in pairs.
What your measure still misses: where people spend the day. Living apart and meeting are different things — people work, study and shop across the line.
Figure 13
Same 400 people. Same city. Drawn one way it is perfectly mixed; drawn another way it is completely divided. Nothing moved.
The obvious answer is that people are prejudiced. The obvious answer turns out to be unnecessary.
In 1971 Thomas Schelling asked what would happen if people were only mildly concerned about their neighbours.
Not hostile. Not seeking to exclude anyone. Simply preferring not to be an extreme minority on their own street.
Your intuition says mild preferences should produce mild sorting. Hold on to that, and watch what the model does.
Figure 14
At the start, the average person’s neighbours were 50% their own group. At the end: 75%.
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flowchart LR
A["A mild<br/>preference"] --> B["A few<br/>people move"]
B --> C["The street<br/>tips"]
C --> D["Neighbours<br/>move too"]
D -->|"and again"| B
C --> E["Segregation"]
Author’s illustration, after Schelling (1971). The loop is the whole point.
Author’s simulation, after Schelling (1971). Each round, people with fewer than 30% same-colour neighbours swap houses with each other. Nobody’s preference changes.
Schelling shows sharp sorting does not require hostility or exclusion. That is not evidence that there is none of either. So stop inferring it from maps and test it directly:
Because everything else is held fixed, a gap in replies is hard to explain away. This is the correspondence study design.
Same clothes. Same pose. Identical CV behind each one.
Photographs: Arceo-Gómez & Campos-Vázquez, Appendix A. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) found a comparable gap in the United States using names alone.
The design travels, though: run it on landlords instead of employers and you have a test of the housing market. That has been done in Sweden and the United States — rarely in Mexico.
Two intuitions, pointing opposite ways:
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flowchart LR
A["Equal<br/>standing"] --> X["Intergroup<br/>contact"]
B["A shared<br/>goal"] --> X
C["Working<br/>together"] --> X
D["Institutional<br/>support"] --> X
X --> E["Less<br/>prejudice"]
Author’s illustration, after Allport (1954). Contact is the mechanism; the four are the conditions Allport said it needs to work. Note what is not here — proximity on its own.
Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) pooled 515 studies. Contact reduces prejudice on average — and Allport’s conditions strengthen that effect rather than being required for it.
So the honest claim is about odds, not impossibility: a divided city makes the good sort of contact rarer, and leaves more of what is left to the kinds that help least.
Ahmed, A. M., & Hammarstedt, M. (2008). Discrimination in the rental housing market: A field experiment on the Internet. Journal of Urban Economics, 64(2), 362–372.
Allport, G. W. (1954). The Nature of Prejudice. Addison-Wesley.
Arceo-Gómez, E. O., & Campos-Vázquez, R. M. (2014). Race and marriage in the labor market: A discrimination correspondence study in a developing country. American Economic Review, 104(5), 376–380.
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). Are Emily and Greg more employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A field experiment on labor market discrimination. American Economic Review, 94(4), 991–1013.
CONEVAL. (2021). Medición de la pobreza a nivel municipio 2020. Mexico City: Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social.
Huntington, S. P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon & Schuster.
Hanson, A., & Hawley, Z. (2011). Do landlords discriminate in the rental housing market? Evidence from an internet field experiment in US cities. Journal of Urban Economics, 70(2–3), 99–114.
INEGI. (2021). Censo de Población y Vivienda 2020. Aguascalientes: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía.
Massey, D. S., & Denton, N. A. (1988). The dimensions of residential segregation. Social Forces, 67(2), 281–315.
Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90(5), 751–783.
Schelling, T. C. (1971). Dynamic models of segregation. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 1(2), 143–186.
Popescu (TEC) Diversity in a Globalized World — Lecture 4: Segregation