| Country | Migrants (%) | Net migration | Remittances (% GDP) |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Arab Emirates | 76.0 | 92,541 | NA |
| Germany | 18.0 | 203,468 | 0.5 |
| United States | 14.9 | 329,769 | 0.0 |
| Mexico | 1.1 | -147,456 | 3.9 |
Lecture 3: People on the Move
Monday’s hit American towns did not empty out. Mexico’s exposed regions were different — people moved.
Today: why they leave, where they go, and what follows them back.
Surveys in rich countries find people overestimate the share of migrants around them, usually by more than a factor of two.
Alesina, Miano & Stantcheva (2023), six-country survey.
The true global figure is 3.6%.
The interesting fact is not the size. It is the distribution.
Figure 1
The extremes are small and rich: Qatar 78%, the UAE 76%, Kuwait 69%. The United States is 15%. Mexico is 1%.
| Country | Migrants (%) | Net migration | Remittances (% GDP) |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Arab Emirates | 76.0 | 92,541 | NA |
| Germany | 18.0 | 203,468 | 0.5 |
| United States | 14.9 | 329,769 | 0.0 |
| Mexico | 1.1 | -147,456 | 3.9 |
Only 1% of people in Mexico were born abroad. But net migration is negative and remittances are 4% of GDP.
To see the other half, we first need to ask why people leave.
The same worker, doing the same job, earns several times more in a rich country than in a poor one.
Clemens (2011) — today’s reading.
Clemens (2011) calls the unrealised gains from this gap “trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk.”
If money were all that mattered, far more people would move than actually do.
%%{init: {"flowchart": {"useMaxWidth": true, "htmlLabels": true, "padding": 26,
"nodeSpacing": 20, "rankSpacing": 80},
"themeVariables": {"fontSize": "19px", "fontFamily": "Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif"}} }%%
flowchart LR
A["Wage gap<br/>abroad"] --> D{"Decide"}
B["Cost of<br/>travel"] --> D
C["Visas and<br/>borders"] --> D
E["Someone<br/>already there"] --> D
D --> F["Migration"]
Author’s illustration. The gap creates the incentive; the other three decide who can act on it.
As a country grows richer, more people can afford to leave — before rising wages at home eventually make them stay.
Figure 3
Research that does measure emigration finds the hump: it rises with income across poor countries, then falls (Clemens, 2014; Dao et al., 2018). The mechanism is the one we just built — the poorest cannot pay the cost, and the richest no longer need to.
Munshi (2003) shows this for Mexican migrants: those with larger established networks in the United States were more likely to be employed on arrival.
Two villages, same country. Going abroad costs 50,000 pesos, paid before you leave.
Quick first: which village sends more people abroad?
Now the real question. A new road halves the cost, to 25,000 pesos. Which village changes more?
Five minutes, in pairs.
Everyone who leaves is still connected to the place they left. That connection has a price, and it is measurable.
Figure 4
Mexico is pale on the first map and clearly visible on the second.
The most dependent economies are small ones: Kyrgyzstan 32% of GDP, Tajikistan 27%, Nepal 24%.
Figure 5
Yang (2011) reviews the evidence: remittances raise consumption and schooling, and cushion shocks.
Remember who leaves: not the poorest. Leaving costs money.
Two other costs have their own literatures: the loss of skilled workers, smaller and more mixed than “brain drain” suggests (Docquier & Rapoport 2012), and what years apart cost families raising children (Parreñas 2005).
Which leaves the question everyone actually argues about.
Do migrants lower wages for workers already there?
The theory is simple: more workers, same jobs, lower pay.
Testing it is hard, because migrants choose where to go — they move to places already doing well.
Cuban refugees arriving in Florida during the Mariel boatlift, 1980. Source: Wikimedia Commons, public domain.
So the argument is not about what happened in Miami. It is about which workers you count.
Borjas’s group is a few dozen men a year in the survey. The share of Black workers in that small sample rose sharply after 1980, and Clemens and Hunt show that alone can produce the drop.
%%{init: {"flowchart": {"useMaxWidth": true, "htmlLabels": true, "padding": 26,
"nodeSpacing": 34, "rankSpacing": 80},
"themeVariables": {"fontSize": "19px", "fontFamily": "Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif"}} }%%
flowchart LR
A["Same event:<br/>Mariel 1980"] --> B["Which<br/>workers do<br/>you count?"]
A --> C["Which<br/>cities do you<br/>compare?"]
B --> D["Different<br/>answer"]
C --> D
D --> E["The answer<br/>depends on<br/>those choices"]
Author’s illustration, after Card (1990) and Borjas (2017).
National Academies (2017) reviews the US evidence: effects on natives overall are very small; where negative effects appear, they fall on earlier immigrants and on workers without a high-school diploma.
That is not a dodge. It is the honest state of a genuinely contested literature.
125,000 people arrive in Miami in four months, and wages change. Did they cause it? You need a second city — one that shows what Miami would have done anyway.
1. Which city would you use? What goes wrong with it?
| Atlanta | Los Angeles | Tampa |
|---|---|---|
| no big arrivals; economy growing fast in the 1980s | a gateway city — new arrivals every year | same state; smaller, older, more retirees |
2. Whose wages would you look at? all workers · no high-school diploma · construction workers · Cubans already in Miami
Five minutes, in pairs.
The city. Card used four averaged together — Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, Tampa — so no single city’s quirks decide the answer.
| Whose wages | Verdict |
|---|---|
| Cubans already in Miami | closest substitutes — where Card looked |
| No high-school diploma | right idea, tiny sample — the Borjas problem |
| Construction workers | moves with Miami’s own building boom |
| All workers | 125,000 arrivals vanish in a big market |
A good comparison is not a city that looks like Miami. It is one that was moving like Miami until 1980.
A country can be transformed by migration without a single migrant arriving.
Alesina, A., Miano, A., & Stantcheva, S. (2023). Immigration and redistribution. The Review of Economic Studies, 90(1), 1–39.
Borjas, G. J. (2017). The wage impact of the Marielitos: A reappraisal. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 70(5), 1077–1110.
Card, D. (1990). The impact of the Mariel boatlift on the Miami labor market. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43(2), 245–257.
Clemens, M. A. (2011). Economics and emigration: Trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3), 83–106.
Clemens, M. A., & Hunt, J. (2019). The labor market effects of refugee waves: Reconciling conflicting results. ILR Review, 72(4), 818–857.
Clemens, M. A. (2014). Does development reduce migration? In R. E. B. Lucas (Ed.), International Handbook on Migration and Economic Development (pp. 152–185). Edward Elgar.
Dao, T. H., Docquier, F., Parsons, C., & Peri, G. (2018). Migration and development: Dissecting the anatomy of the mobility transition. Journal of Development Economics, 132, 88–101.
Docquier, F., & Rapoport, H. (2012). Globalization, brain drain, and development. Journal of Economic Literature, 50(3), 681–730.
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. (2017). The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
Munshi, K. (2003). Networks in the modern economy: Mexican migrants in the U.S. labor market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2), 549–599.
Peri, G., & Yasenov, V. (2019). The labor market effects of a refugee wave: Synthetic control method meets the Mariel boatlift. Journal of Human Resources, 54(2), 267–309.
Parreñas, R. S. (2005). Children of Global Migration: Transnational Families and Gendered Woes. Stanford University Press.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2021). International Migrant Stock 2020. New York: United Nations.
World Bank. (2024). World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Yang, D. (2011). Migrant remittances. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3), 129–152.
Popescu (TEC) Diversity in a Globalized World — Lecture 3: Migration