Diversity in a Globalized World

Lecture 3: People on the Move

Bogdan G. Popescu

Tecnológico de Monterrey

Three numbers

  • 304 million people live in a country they were not born in — mid-2024
  • That is 3.7% of humanity — one person in twenty-seven
  • Money they send home is worth more than all foreign aid combined

Monday’s hit American towns did not empty out. Mexico’s exposed regions were different — people moved.

Today: why they leave, where they go, and what follows them back.

Learning objectives

  • Distinguish immigration, emigration and net migration
  • Describe the global pattern of migration and remittances
  • Explain why development can increase emigration
  • Explain why migration clusters in networks
  • Assess what the evidence says about wages in receiving countries

Most people guess too high

Surveys in rich countries find people overestimate the share of migrants around them, usually by more than a factor of two.

Asked how many people in the United States were immigrants, respondents said 36%. The true figure was about 10%.

Alesina, Miano & Stantcheva (2023), six-country survey. Their benchmark counts legal immigrants; the foreign-born share on the next map is wider, at 15%. On either definition the guess is more than double the truth.

The interesting fact is not the size. It is the distribution.

Three words to keep straight

Term Who it counts Mexico, 2020
Immigrants arrivals — counted where they now live 1.3 million, or 1% of people in Mexico
Emigrants departures — counted by where they were born 11.5 million, or 9% of Mexico’s population
Net migration arrivals minus departures about −150,000 a year

Same country, same year: the second number is nine times the first. A single “migration” figure cannot stand in for both.

Where migrants live

Figure 1

The extremes are small and rich: Qatar 78%, the UAE 76%, Kuwait 69%. The United States is 15%. Mexico is 1%.

Mexico looks untouched

Table 1
Country Migrants (%) Net migration Remittances (% GDP)
United Arab Emirates 76.0 92,541 NA
Germany 18.0 203,468 0.5
United States 14.9 329,769 0.0
Mexico 1.1 -147,456 3.9

Only 1% of people in Mexico were born abroad. But net migration is negative and remittances are 4% of GDP.

Who gains and who loses

Figure 2

What that graph cannot show

  • Net migration is arrivals minus departures
  • A country can send many people abroad and still gain people overall
  • So we cannot read emigration off it

To ask who leaves, we have to count people by where they came from, not by where they ended up.

So what?

  • Migration is small globally, concentrated locally
  • One map only shows the countries people arrive in
  • A country can be shaped by migration without receiving anyone

To see the other half, we first need to ask why people leave.

II. Why People Leave

The wage gap is enormous

The same worker, doing the same job, earns several times more in a rich country than in a poor one.

Clemens (2011) — today’s reading.

Clemens (2011) calls the unrealised gains from this gap “trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk.”

If money were all that mattered, far more people would move than actually do.

What stops them

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  B["Cost of<br/>travel"] --> D
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  D --> F["Migration"]
Figure 3

Why the poorest often cannot leave

  • Moving costs money: transport, documents, months without earnings
  • The very poorest cannot pay those costs
  • So emigration is low in the poorest countries

If that is right, emigration should be low at the bottom of the income scale, higher in the middle, and low again at the top. We can check it.

Emigration peaks in the middle

Figure 4

The hump, in medians

Table 2
GDP per capita Countries Median % living abroad
under $2,000 44 3.9
$2,000–5,000 40 5.7
$5,000–15,000 37 7.4
$15,000–40,000 25 5.8
over $40,000 21 3.5

The poorest band and the richest band send out about the same modest share. The middle sends out roughly twice as much.

What lifts the rising half

  • Being able to pay — the mechanism in the village exercise
  • Who is in the population — more schooling means more people with portable skills
  • Networks — each cohort abroad makes the next trip cheaper and safer

Why migration clusters

  • The first migrant faces the highest cost and the greatest risk
  • The second follows a known route, to a known contact
  • Each arrival lowers the cost for the next

Munshi (2003) shows this for Mexican migrants: those with larger established networks in the United States were more likely to be employed on arrival.

Exercise 1 — Who gets to leave?

One village. The same job in the United States pays any of them 250,000 pesos a year. Getting there costs 100,000 pesos, all of it paid before you leave — and in this village that is the only way north.

Household Earns at home Can put up now
Ana 40,000 10,000 saved
Beto 55,000 60,000 — four years of saving
Carmen 45,000 20,000, and a sister in Houston who will send whatever is missing
Diego 400,000 150,000; owns the village shop

A household leaves if it can cover the whole cost before departure, and would earn more abroad than at home.

1. Who leaves?    2. A new road and a cheaper bus halve the cost, to 50,000. Whose answer changes?

Five minutes, in pairs.

Exercise 1 — Responses

Household Leaves?
Ana no 10,000 against 100,000 — and still no at 50,000
Beto not yet saved for four years and is 40,000 short
Carmen yes poorer than Beto, goes anyway — the sister is the finance
Diego no the only one who could pay cash, the only one with no gap to close

Q2: Beto’s answer, and only Beto’s. He earns 55,000 — barely more than Ana. The road reaches the household just above the one it cannot help.

Both ends of the scale stay home, and cheaper travel does not reach the bottom. Migration comes from the middle.

▶ The cheapest ticket

The poorest cannot leave. Or can they?

We have just concluded that Ana stays: the trip costs more than she has, at either price.

Dunia’s family has almost nothing — and they are already a thousand miles into the journey.

1. Does the video contradict the exercise?

2. If you cannot pay in money, what do you pay in instead?

Three minutes, in pairs.

What the model leaves out

In the exercise In the video
People leave for higher wages Dunia’s family leaves because staying is dangerous
One route, one price, paid in cash Several routes, paid in cash, time or risk
Cannot pay → stays Cannot pay → takes the cheaper, deadlier route

The constraint does not only decide whether people move. It decides how.

This does not overturn the chart. Poorer countries still send a smaller share of their people, and a tendency across 167 countries was never a claim about every family. What it overturns is the idea that “cannot afford it” means “stays at home”.

So what?

  • Wage gaps create the incentive; costs decide who can act
  • Development first raises emigration, then lowers it
  • Networks make migration self-reinforcing once it starts
  • Costs shape how people move, not only whether they move :::

Everyone who leaves is still connected to the place they left. That connection has a price, and it is measurable.

Remittances: the second map

Figure 5

Almost the opposite map

  • Map 1 was dark in the Gulf, North America, Australia
  • Map 2 is dark in Central America, the Caucasus, West Africa
  • Same phenomenon, seen from each end

Mexico is pale on the first map and clearly visible on the second.

The most dependent economies are small ones: Kyrgyzstan 32% of GDP, Tajikistan 27%, Nepal 24%.

Mexico, 1990 to 2023

Figure 6

What that money does

  • It goes to households, not governments
  • It often rises when the household back home is hit by a shock
  • It is more stable than foreign investment during crises

Yang (2011) reviews the evidence: remittances raise consumption and schooling, and cushion shocks.

The insurance only runs one way. When it is the migrant who loses work, or the host economy that turns down, remittances can fall exactly when they are most needed.

The other side of the money

Remember who leaves: rarely the poorest. Leaving costs money.

  • So remittances tend to reach the households that could cover the trip — by saving, or through a relative already abroad
  • Where that holds, they can widen the gap inside a village rather than close it
  • Where networks reach further down, they can narrow it

Is more leaving a problem?

DEBATE: Make the journey cheap and safe, and more people will go. Is that a failure?

FOR: Sending countries lose working-age people they paid to raise and educate.

AGAINST: Those who leave are far better off, and what they send home dwarfs all foreign aid.

You now have both halves of the ledger: what the sending country loses, and the 3.7% of Mexico’s economy that comes back.

So what?

  • Migration binds two economies together, not one
  • The receiving country gains workers; the sending country gains income
  • Neither map alone describes what happened

Which leaves the question everyone actually argues about.

The question everyone asks

Do migrants lower wages for workers already there?

The theory is simple: more workers, same jobs, lower pay.

Testing it is hard, because migrants choose where to go — they move to places already doing well.

Why the simple theory can fail

“More workers, same jobs” assumes the jobs stay the same. Three reasons they do not:

  • Arrivals are not copies of the people already there. Different skills complement rather than replace, and natives move into the work where they hold the advantage
  • Arrivals are also customers. They rent, eat and buy, raising the demand for labour as well as the supply of it
  • Firms react. Where workers are easier to find, businesses expand and new ones open

A natural experiment

  • April 1980: Cuba briefly allowed emigration from the port of Mariel
  • About 125,000 people left for Florida in six months
  • Miami’s labour force grew roughly 7% almost overnight
  • Miami’s labour supply jumped for reasons unrelated to Miami’s economy

Mariel, 1980

Cuban refugees arriving in Florida during the Mariel boatlift, 1980. Source: Wikimedia Commons, public domain.

Two economists, one event

  • Card (1990): Miami against four similar cities → no measurable effect on wages
  • Borjas (2017): only non-Hispanic men, 25–59, without a high-school diploma → a large fall
  • Peri & Yasenov (2019); Clemens & Hunt (2019): same data, re-examined → the fall does not survive

So the argument is not about what happened in Miami. It is about which workers you count.

Borjas’s group is a few dozen men a year in the survey. The share of Black workers in that small sample rose sharply after 1980, and Clemens and Hunt show that alone can produce the drop.

Why they disagree

One event, two designs:

Card (1990) Borjas (2017)
Whose wages whites, Blacks, non-Cuban Hispanics and Cubans, split by income quartile non-Hispanic men, 25–59, no high-school diploma
Compared with Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles and Tampa, averaged several alternative control groups
How many people the city’s workforce a few dozen men a year
Answer no measurable effect a large fall

Neither is cheating. The design choices are the finding — which is why Peri & Yasenov and Clemens & Hunt could re-run the same data and recover Card’s answer.

What we can say

  • Average effects on wages are small in most studies
  • Effects concentrate on workers most similar to arrivals
  • The answer depends heavily on how you define the comparison group

Exercise 2 — Design the test

125,000 people arrive in Miami in four months, and wages change. Did they cause it? You need a second city — one that shows what Miami would have done anyway.

1. Which city would you use? What goes wrong with it?

Atlanta Los Angeles Tampa
no big arrivals; economy growing fast in the 1980s a gateway city — new arrivals every year same state; smaller, older, more retirees

2. Whose wages would you look at — and what would that choice let you say? all workers · no high-school diploma · construction workers · Cubans already in Miami

Five minutes, in pairs.

Exercise 2 — Responses

The city. Card used four averaged together — Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, Tampa — so no single city’s quirks decide the answer.

The workers. There is no single right answer here — each choice answers a different question.

Whose wages What it can tell you What it costs you
All workers the average effect on the city a real effect on a small group disappears into the average
No high-school diploma the effect where competition should bite hardest the sample shrinks fast — the Borjas problem
Cubans in Miami the effect on the closest substitutes also the group most tied into the arrivals’ own networks
Construction the effect in one exposed sector moves with Miami’s building cycle, not just with arrivals

Card reported several of these, including Cubans and workers by income quartile.

A good comparison is not a city that looks like Miami. It is one that was moving like Miami until 1980.

And matching trends before 1980 is the strongest check available, not a proof. It cannot rule out that something else hit Miami and the control cities differently in exactly those years.

Takeaways

  1. Migration is 3.7% of humanity, very unevenly placed
  2. Development raises emigration before it lowers it
  3. Networks make migration self-reinforcing
  4. Remittances bind sending and receiving economies together
  5. Wage effects are small on average, contested at the margins

A country can be transformed by migration without a single migrant arriving.

References

Alesina, A., Miano, A., & Stantcheva, S. (2023). Immigration and redistribution. The Review of Economic Studies, 90(1), 1–39.

Borjas, G. J. (2017). The wage impact of the Marielitos: A reappraisal. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 70(5), 1077–1110.

Card, D. (1990). The impact of the Mariel boatlift on the Miami labor market. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43(2), 245–257.

Clemens, M. A. (2011). Economics and emigration: Trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3), 83–106.

Clemens, M. A., & Hunt, J. (2019). The labor market effects of refugee waves: Reconciling conflicting results. ILR Review, 72(4), 818–857.

Clemens, M. A. (2014). Does development reduce migration? In R. E. B. Lucas (Ed.), International Handbook on Migration and Economic Development (pp. 152–185). Edward Elgar.

Dao, T. H., Docquier, F., Parsons, C., & Peri, G. (2018). Migration and development: Dissecting the anatomy of the mobility transition. Journal of Development Economics, 132, 88–101.

References (cont.)

Docquier, F., & Rapoport, H. (2012). Globalization, brain drain, and development. Journal of Economic Literature, 50(3), 681–730.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. (2017). The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

Munshi, K. (2003). Networks in the modern economy: Mexican migrants in the U.S. labor market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2), 549–599.

Peri, G., & Yasenov, V. (2019). The labor market effects of a refugee wave: Synthetic control method meets the Mariel boatlift. Journal of Human Resources, 54(2), 267–309.

Parreñas, R. S. (2005). Children of Global Migration: Transnational Families and Gendered Woes. Stanford University Press.

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2021). International Migrant Stock 2020. New York: United Nations.

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2025). International Migrant Stock 2024. New York: United Nations.

World Bank. (2024). World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Yang, D. (2011). Migrant remittances. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3), 129–152.