The Politics of Corruption

Lecture 14: Final Review

Bogdan G. Popescu

Tecnológico de Monterrey

Today

Today has four parts.

  • Where we are — what the second half of the course added, and how the grade is built.
  • The exam — when, where, how long, and what the paper looks like.
  • The toolkit — the ideas from Sessions 8 to 13 that are on the paper, session by session.
  • Practice — seven exercises, with the answers worked.

Part I — Where We Are

What the second half added

Session The question it answers
8 How corruption is measured if the act is hidden, what are we counting?
9 Machines why pay for a vote you cannot see?
10 China and Hong Kong can corruption and growth go together — and how did one city get clean?
11 Kleptocracy how does public money leave the country, and why does it not come back?
12 Organized crime what changes when the buyer can also shoot?
13 Technology if we can detect it, does it stop?

Thursday’s exam is Sessions 8–13 only.

Not cumulative — but not Session 8 from zero either

The paper asks nothing about Sessions 1–7. Two things from the first half are still tools you need on Thursday:

  • Klitgaard, C = M + D – A (Session 3). Session 13’s first question — does this innovation address a cause of corruption? — is that formula being used as a checklist.
  • The reading moves (Session 2): what was measured, compared with what, which rivals. Part F is those three moves on a study you have not seen.

You will not be asked to name Klitgaard or define a confounder. You will be asked to use them on Sessions 8–13 material.

How the grade is built

  • Contributions to class — a third
    • your 10-minute presentation
    • presence
    • participation in class
    • the weekly questions
    • the quality of those questions
  • Midterm — a third
  • Final — a third

The midterm is behind you. Thursday is the last third.

Part II — The Exam

When, where, how long

When Thursday 3 December, in class
Where In Canvas, on your own screen
How long 30 minutes
Covers Sessions 8–13
Worth 33% of your grade

Closed book. No notes, no books, no browser tabs except Canvas.

The Exam

Seven short parts, thirty-two items. Twenty-three of them need only a label or a letter.

Part What it asks Answer looks like
A Name the measure one name from a printed list
B Name the exchange one name from a printed list
C Name the concept one name from a printed list
D What made the violence rise? one label + one sentence
E Explain the pattern one phrase + a few words
F Read the study two answers, 2–3 sentences each
G Match the reading one letter

Each list has one option per question: you use each option exactly once. The exception is Part G, which has one extra option.

Today’s exercises are the practice paper, and they work the same way. So the last answer in each part is the one to be careful about — if you have guessed your way to it, you have not checked it.

Where the marks actually are

Twenty-three items are a single word. They are not where the paper is decided.

  • Part D is worth three marks an item: one for the label, two for the sentence. The sentence has to say who lost what protection, or what was left behind worth taking.
  • Part E gives one mark for the phrase. If the answer is “something else causes both”, the other two marks need the name of that something else.
  • Part F is two answers of two or three sentences. “The measure is bad” earns nothing; say what was counted, by whom, and compared with what.

Almost every mark lost on the midterm was lost in the sentence, not the label.

Part III — The Toolkit, Session by Session

Session 8 — Four families of measure

Nobody counts the act. Every number counts a trace the act left behind, and the four families observe four different traces.

What it observes Where it is blind
Expert perceptions (CPI) what country experts and executives assess nobody in the data was asked whether they paid
Citizen and firm experience what happened to this person in this transaction grand corruption: contracts, capture, procurement
Audits and missing money what was built, against what was billed needs engineers, and only where there is a physical thing
Market-based inference a price that is wrong, in public tells you a rent was created, not who took it

Measure: an observable trace we agree to treat as a stand-in for something we cannot see directly.

Session 8 — The CPI is an average of other people’s work

  • It runs no survey of its own: it combines at least 3 of 13 existing sources, rescaled onto 0–100.
  • Mexico’s eight sources scored it anywhere from 19 to 37 — the same country, the same year.
  • They disagree because they score different things, ask different people, and carry different vintages.
  • The composite averages that disagreement away rather than settling it.

A falling CPI score shows that assessments changed. It does not yet show that behaviour did.

Session 8 — Perception and experience pull apart

Different referent, different denominator, different people answering. Both numbers are right.

Session 8 — Olken: what was built, and what people believe

Physical audit: engineers compared what was built with what was billed in 477 village road projects in Java.

  • 24% of reported spending was missing; officials inflated quantities, not prices.
  • Villagers’ perceptions barely tracked the missing money (3,691 respondents).
  • More ethnically diverse villages reported more corruption, but had less missing money.

Perceptions and audits tell us different things. Suspicion is not the same as theft.

Session 8 — Why the theft hid in the quantities

A tractor tipping crushed stone from a trailer onto heaps of river gravel and sand beside a rural track.

Everyone in the village knows what a cubic metre of gravel costs. Nobody can look at a heap and say how many arrived.

So the theft moved into the dimension nobody could check — which is why the audit needed engineers, not just eyes. Detection shapes the crime, not only our measurement.

Photo: Greg Willis, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 2.0.

Session 9 — What is clientelism?

Clientelism: politicians provide targeted benefits in exchange for political support.

Hicken (2011) identifies four key characteristics:

  1. Dyadic (personal) — a politician gives food to a particular voter.
  2. Contingent (conditional) — the voter receives food in exchange for political support.
  3. Hierarchical (unequal) — the politician controls resources that the voter needs.
  4. Iterated (repeated) — both expect the exchange to continue in the future.

Remember:

  • Clientelism: an ongoing exchange of favors for political support.
  • Vote buying: money or goods in exchange for a vote.
  • Turnout buying: money or goods in exchange for voting.
  • Patronage: public jobs in exchange for political support.

Session 9 — Five exchanges, told apart

Term Who receives What is exchanged The test
Programmatic anyone who qualifies a policy rule you get it even if you voted against
Patronage party insiders a public job paid for party work, in a post
Vote buying ordinary voters cash, food, goods the debt is settled at the ballot box
Turnout buying the party’s own passive supporters a ride, a favour, a small payment nobody asks which box, only that you went
Clientelist service named residents access to the state it comes back next time, and someone is watching

Two questions do most of the work: who gets it, and does political support decide whether they get it.

Programmatic politics

A campaign scene in which a candidate promises a pension to a crowd of older residents.

A benefit written into a rule. The test: you receive it whether or not you voted for her — so nothing about your politics needs to be known at all.

Patronage

A party office scene in which a campaign volunteer is handed a public appointment.

The currency here is a public job, and it is paid for party work rather than for a vote. That is what separates it from the three below.

Vote buying

A party worker at a doorstep handing a household goods shortly before an election.

One payment, one election. The test: the debt is settled at the ballot box and nothing carries forward — so there is no next time to withhold.

Turnout buying

Party workers with clipboards helping residents onto a minibus outside a polling station.

Her own supporters, and a ride rather than a payment. The test: nobody asks which box you ticked, only that you went — and that is a thing she can actually check.

This is Nichter’s answer to the secret ballot: stop buying the thing you cannot verify, and buy the thing you can.

Clientelist service

A party distribution point handing out flour and cooking oil to a queue of residents while a worker writes names on a clipboard; a banner reads same people, same support, every election, above a list of election years.

The flour is not what makes this clientelism. The clues are the banner — same people, same support, every election, with the years ticked off — and the clipboard.

Ask what happens after the election. If the deal ends there it was vote buying. If it comes back at the next one, and somebody is keeping a list, it is clientelism.

Session 9 — What the secret ballot changed

Before. Parties printed their own ballots — distinctive paper, visible in the hand.

A printed 1888 Union Labor Party ticket on coloured paper, listing candidates for president, state, county and township offices.

After. One official ballot, marked behind a screen: el voto es secreto.

A voter marks a ballot behind a folding cardboard screen printed with the words EL VOTO ES SECRETO at a Mexican polling station.

Massachusetts 1888; Argentina’s Sáenz Peña Law 1912. Compliance stops being visible — and every machine built on compliance now has a problem.

Left: Cornell University Library. Right: ProtoplasmaKid, CC BY-SA 4.0. Both via Wikimedia Commons.

Session 9 — The puzzle, and three answers

If the ballot is secret, why pay for a vote you cannot verify?

What is bought What makes the voter keep their side
Stokes the vote the broker may work out how you voted, and cut off the flow next time
Nichter the turnout she can see whether you showed up; your vote stays secret
Finan & Schechter the vote you feel you owe her; nobody has to watch at all

Nichter changes what is bought. Finan and Schechter change who does the enforcing — you do.

Session 9 — Stokes (2005): Vote buying and the secret ballot

The puzzle: Why can’t voters take the money and then vote for another party?

  • Monitoring: brokers live in the same neighborhoods as voters and know their political preferences.
  • Inference: brokers cannot see the ballot, but they can guess how people voted.
  • Punishment: if voters are suspected of voting for another party, they may lose future benefits.

Perverse accountability: instead of voters holding politicians accountable, politicians hold voters accountable.

Evidence from Argentina: Who was more likely to receive benefits?

  • Poor voters — they value the benefits more.
  • Voters in small towns — they are easier to monitor.
  • Less committed voters — their votes are easier to influence.

37% of respondents believed that parties could find out how people voted.

Session 10 — Ang: Four types of corruption

Ang distinguishes between types of corruption based on two questions:

  • Who? Low-level officials or powerful elites?
  • What? Stealing resources or exchanging favors?
Taking Trading
Non-elites Petty theft: a clerk steals public money Speed money: paying a bribe to get a permit faster
Elites Grand theft: a minister embezzles millions Access money: bribing a politician to obtain a lucrative contract

Ang compares corruption to drugs:

  • Petty and grand theft — toxic drugs
  • Speed money — painkillers
  • Access money — steroids

Different types of corruption have different economic consequences.

Session 10 — Why did China grow despite corruption?

Between 1978 and 2010, China’s economy grew roughly 9% per year, despite rising corruption (Wedeman’s double paradox).

Ang’s explanation: the composition of corruption changed, with access money becoming more important.

  • A politician gives a developer privileged access to land.
  • In exchange, the politician receives a share of the profits.
  • Both have an incentive to complete the project: Economic growth also helps the politician’s career.

What is the problem?

  • Politically connected firms receive unfair advantages.
  • The government loses potential revenue.

Access money can coexist with economic growth. This does not mean that corruption causes growth.

Session 10 — Hong Kong: Who investigates the police?

  • Before 1974: corruption was widespread and organized within the police.
  • 1973: a police officer under investigation fled Hong Kong.
  • 1974: Hong Kong established the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).

The ICAC operates independently of the police. The police cannot stop investigations into their own corruption.

ICAC headquarters, North Point, Hong Kong. Photo: Citobun, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

Session 10 — Manion: How did Hong Kong reduce corruption?

Corruption equilibrium: people engage in corruption because they expect everyone else to do the same.

The ICAC adopted three strategies:

Strategy Objective
Deterrence Increase the risk of getting caught
Prevention Reduce opportunities for corruption
Education Change what citizens consider acceptable

Why was the ICAC credible?

  • Independence from the police
  • Permanent staff and funding
  • Visible enforcement and a one-time partial amnesty

Fighting systemic corruption requires changing both incentives and expectations.

Session 11 — Windfall, rent, and the fiscal contract

Two governments both raise $100 billion. A collects it from millions of taxpayers. B sells oil to foreign buyers.

  • A has to persuade millions of people to keep paying, and scrutiny is the price of their consent. Political scientists call that bargain the fiscal contract.
  • B never has to strike it. Its revenue is a windfall: money nobody at home had to be asked for.

Rent — the gap between what something costs to produce and what it sells for. Oil costs $20 a barrel to lift and sells for $80. The $20 pays for the work; the $60 is there because the oil was already in the ground.

Aid is a windfall too. In the 50 most aid-dependent countries in Svensson’s data it financed 53.8% of central government spending.

Session 11 — Svensson: Can more aid make things worse?

Imagine that the World Bank gives a government an additional $100 million to build hospitals.

  • Different political groups compete to control the money.
  • They spend resources on lobbying, political favors, and influencing government officials.
  • The more money is available, the greater the incentive to compete for it.
  • Resources are wasted competing for money rather than providing public services.

Rent-seeking: spending resources to obtain existing wealth rather than creating new wealth.

More foreign aid can result in fewer public goods. Credible conditions on aid can reduce this problem.

Session 11 — How does a kickback work?

The World Bank provides $10 million to build a road.

  • A government official awards the contract to a company.
  • The company receives $10 million but builds a road worth only $6 million.
  • The company gives $2.5 million to the government official.
  • The company keeps the remaining $1.5 million.
Where the money goes Amount
Road construction $6 million
Government official $2.5 million
Company’s extra profit $1.5 million
Total $10 million

Kickback: a payment to an official in return for awarding a contract or providing another favor.

The accounts may look correct even when corruption occurs.

Session 11 — Where does the stolen money go?

The government official wants to hide his $2.5 million.

  • Shell company: a company with little or no business activity that can hold money and assets.
  • Beneficial owner: the person who ultimately owns or controls the company or its assets.
  • Offshore haven: a jurisdiction offering financial privacy, asset protection, and often low taxes.

Why is recovering stolen money difficult?

  • Authorities need to establish that a crime occurred.
  • They need to identify the real owner and trace the money.
  • They need cooperation from foreign authorities.

Shell companies and offshore accounts are not inherently illegal, but they can be used to conceal stolen wealth.

Session 11 — What does an offshore haven look like?

Ugland House, Cayman Islands: the registered address of thousands of companies.

Photo: Coolcaesar, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0.

Session 11 — Andersen et al.: How can we detect stolen aid?

Research question: Do political elites steal foreign aid and deposit the money in offshore bank accounts?

  • Data: World Bank aid disbursements and international bank deposits.
  • Sample: 22 highly aid-dependent countries.
  • Timing: What happens to foreign bank deposits when countries receive aid?
  • Comparison: Deposits in offshore havens versus deposits in other financial centers.

Prediction: if elites use offshore havens to hide stolen aid, deposits in havens should increase when foreign aid arrives.

Session 12 — Two ways to corrupt a public official

Diego: bribery

Diego pays the customs officer to let his truck through.

Cartel: bribery + threats

The cartel offers less money but threatens the officer if he refuses.

Why can the cartel obtain the same favor for less money?

Session 12 — Plata o plomo: Money or violence

Imagine that a police officer requires $100 to compensate for the risk of engaging in corruption.

  • Diego: offers $100 in bribes.
  • Cartel: offers $40 in bribes and threatens the officer with harm equivalent to $60 if he refuses.

\[\underbrace{b}_{\text{bribe}} + \underbrace{p}_{\text{threat}} = \underbrace{c}_{\text{cost}}\]

Three implications:

  • Criminal organizations can buy influence with less money.
  • More armed groups may be able to corrupt officials.
  • The amount of money exchanged can underestimate corruption.

Session 12 — Can fighting bribery increase violence?

Bribery and intimidation are substitutes.

Government policy Criminal organizations may respond with
Make bribery more difficult More threats, fewer bribes
Make intimidation more difficult More bribes, fewer threats

How can governments address this problem?

  • Make both bribery and intimidation more difficult.
  • Reduce officials’ discretion (e.g., automated inspections).

Fewer bribes do not necessarily mean less criminal influence.

Session 12 — Trejo and Ley: Can democratization increase violence?

  • Criminal governance: criminal organizations establish and enforce rules.
  • Gray zone: the network of connections between criminal organizations and state officials.
  • Under the PRI, Mexican cartels received protection from government officials.
  • Democratization brought new parties into power.
  • New governments replaced officials who had protected cartels.
  • Cartels became vulnerable to attacks from their rivals.

Democratization disrupted criminal protection networks without necessarily establishing effective state control.

Session 12 — Dell: Can crackdowns increase violence?

Research question: Do government crackdowns reduce drug-related violence?

  • Method: regression discontinuity design (RDD).
  • Comparison: municipalities where the party favoring crackdowns barely won versus barely lost elections.
  • Finding: an increase in annual homicides per 100,000 inhabitants:
    • 57 additional homicides overall.
    • 33 additional drug-related homicides.

Why? Weakening a cartel creates an opportunity for rival cartels to capture its territory.

Weakening a criminal organization is not the same as eliminating criminal competition.

Session 13 — Can technology reduce corruption?

To evaluate any new anticorruption technology, ask:

  1. Mechanism: Does it increase competition, reduce discretion, or increase accountability?

  2. Enforcement: Can anyone act when corruption is detected?

  3. Manipulation: Can officials manipulate or misuse the technology?

  4. Effectiveness: Does corruption actually decrease?

Detecting corruption is not the same as reducing corruption.

Session 13 — Mexico: a better place to look

Session 13 — Can machine learning detect corruption?

Traditional red flags include single bidding, short deadlines, and unusually high prices.

The problem: honest contracts can look suspicious, and corrupt contracts can look legitimate.

  • Data: 2.3 million Mexican public contracts (2011–2022).
  • Training: the model learns to identify patterns associated with sanctioned suppliers, without assuming other suppliers are honest.
  • Networks: the model examines relationships between companies and government agencies.

Machine learning can identify suspicious patterns that are difficult to detect by examining individual contracts.

Session 13 — Six times better, at the top of the list

Still only a list of suspects. And it learned from past sanctions, which follow past audits — so it partly learns where investigators already look, and inherits their blind spots.

Session 13 — Can you fool a satellite?

  • Officials in Punjab were asked to halve detected agricultural fires.
  • Satellites passed over the fields between 10:30 and 13:30.
  • Farmers could avoid detection by burning their fields later in the afternoon.

Imagine a speed camera that only works at lunchtime.

Session 13 — How can we detect hidden fires?

8 November 2021

A field during a fire.

13 November 2021

The same field after the fire.

  • Fires: visible for a few hours.
  • Burn scars: visible for several weeks.

Dasgupta uses burn scars to detect fires that the official monitoring system missed.

Sentinel-2, 10 m per pixel. Contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data (2021).

Session 13 — Dasgupta: When performance indicators fail

Dasgupta compares Punjab with similar agricultural areas across the border that were subject to a different policy.

Goodhart’s law: when a measure becomes a target, people may improve the measure without improving what it is supposed to measure.

Part IV — Practice

Exercise 1 — Name the measure

One name each. Each is used exactly once. Choose from: expert perception index, direct experience survey, physical audit, market-based inference.

  1. A national statistics agency interviews 40,000 households, asks those who dealt with a public office in the past year whether an official requested a payment, and reports the result as a share of those who had contact.
  2. A composite score is built by rescaling eleven existing assessments onto a common 0–100 scale, all of them produced by risk consultancies and academic panels. Nobody in the underlying data is asked whether they paid anything.
  3. Surveyors visit 300 finished school roofs, measure the materials actually in place, price them in the local market, and compare the total with the sums the districts reported spending.
  4. A ministry sells rights to use irrigation water at a fixed official price. A researcher finds that the same rights are resold privately for four times that price.

Exercise 1 — worked

The case Answer Why
1 40,000 households, denominator is those who had contact direct experience survey what happened to them, in their own transaction
2 eleven assessments rescaled into one score expert perception index nobody in the data is asked about a payment
3 engineers measure what was built and price it locally physical audit somebody measured the thing, not what people say
4 official price against the private resale price market-based inference the price is public and wrong, so the rent is visible

Exercise 2 — Name the exchange

One name each. Each is used exactly once. Choose from: programmatic politics, patronage, vote buying, turnout buying, clientelist service.

  1. A governor’s office provides minibuses on election day for three villages that have backed her at every election, and asks only that residents go to the polls.
  2. A new mayor fills forty posts in the municipal parks department with people who ran his campaign.
  3. A national law entitles every household farming under two hectares to a fertiliser subsidy, claimed at any bank branch.
  4. A candidate’s agent hands a shopkeeper cash two days before the vote and asks him to mark his ballot for her. After the election the agent does not come back.
  5. A local union branch gets a member’s disability paperwork approved, finds her nephew a place on a training scheme, and expects the family at the party’s meetings — this year, and at the next election.

Exercise 2 — worked

The case Answer Why
1 minibuses for her own villages, nothing asked about the ballot turnout buying her own supporters, and only attendance is checked
2 forty parks posts for the people who ran his campaign patronage the currency is a public job, paid for party work
3 a subsidy for every household under two hectares, at any bank programmatic politics a rule: you get it however you voted
4 cash two days before, then the agent never returns vote buying the debt is settled at the ballot box
5 paperwork, a training place, and the family at party events clientelist service access to the state, and it comes back next time

Exercise 3 — Name the concept

One name each. Each is used exactly once.

1–4: petty theft, grand theft, speed money, access money.

5–8: windfall, rent, kickback, beneficial owner.

  1. A clerk at the vehicle registry invents an extra processing fee, charges it on every application, and keeps the money.
  2. A minister of health moves $60 million out of a hospital-building account into a private account he controls.
  3. A hotel owner pays a fire inspector so that the certificate is issued this week rather than in three months. The hotel meets every requirement either way.
  4. A property developer finances a governor’s stadium project. In exchange, the state grants it the right to develop the land around the stadium.
  5. A government raises two-thirds of its revenue by selling natural gas abroad rather than by taxing its own citizens.
  6. A government’s offshore gas costs $2 a unit to extract and sells for $8. The $6 difference is there because the gas was already in the ground.
  7. A construction company receives full payment for building a port but uses cheaper materials than the contract required. It gives part of the money it saved to the official who awarded the contract.
  8. A Madrid apartment is owned by a company in Jersey, which is itself owned by a company in Belize. An investigator wants to identify the individual who ultimately controls it.

Exercise 3 — worked

The case Answer Why
1 invents a fee and charges it on every application petty theft non-elite, and one side simply loses
2 $60 million into an account he controls grand theft elite, taking — C1 at a different altitude
3 pays so the certificate comes this week speed money non-elite trade: the certificate was his anyway
4 finances the stadium, gets the development rights access money elite trade: a privilege bought, both expect to gain
5 two-thirds of revenue from gas, not from taxpayers windfall revenue nobody at home had to be asked for
6 $2 to extract, $8 to sell rent the gap that exists from ownership, not effort
7 cheaper materials, and part of the saving goes back kickback the return payment for the award
8 Jersey owns it, Belize owns Jersey beneficial owner the one name the layering is built to withhold

Exercise 4 — What made the violence rise?

A label and one sentence. Choose from: breakdown of political protection; removal of the group that held the territory; intimidation in place of bribery. The sentence must name what changed and what stayed the same. 1 mark for the label, 2 for the sentence.

  1. Soldiers arrest the leaders of the criminal group that has run a port city for twelve years, and the group loses control of it. The port and its smuggling routes are as valuable as ever. Killings in the city double over the following year.
  2. A new governor dismisses the state police commander and the attorney general in her first month. Both had been paid for years to leave the state’s two main criminal groups alone. Within eighteen months the two groups are fighting over the state’s ports.
  3. A government makes paying a customs officer far riskier by tracing payments through the banks, but does nothing to protect officers or their families. Over the next two years recorded bribery in the customs service falls sharply, the same favours are still being granted, threats against officers and their relatives rise, and two officers who refused have been attacked.

Exercise 4 — worked

The case Answer Why
1 the group is removed, the port is as valuable as ever removal of the group that held the territory the prize is still there, so rivals move in
2 the two officials paid to look away are replaced breakdown of political protection neither group knows if the other is still protected
3 bribery gets risky, officers unprotected, threats rise intimidation in place of bribery the instruments substitute; only the currency changed

Exercise 5 — Explain the pattern

A phrase and a few words. Choose from: direct causation (the first causes the second); reverse causation (the second causes the first); confounding (a third factor causes both); measurement gaming (the record moved, the thing measured did not). Name the third factor if you say confounding.

  1. “A state ordered every district to halve the number of recorded illegal dumping incidents. Recorded incidents fell 71%. Independent inspectors arriving at random hours found dumping happening about as often as before.”
  2. “Municipalities where Party A narrowly won the mayoral election had far more homicides over the next three years than municipalities where Party A narrowly lost. Before the election the two sets of municipalities looked very similar.”
  3. “The countries that receive the most technical assistance for anticorruption also score worst on the corruption indices. Each of those assistance programmes began the year after the country’s score fell.”
  4. “Provinces that received larger transfers from the central government also show more emigration to the capital. So the transfers cause people to leave.”

Exercise 5 — worked

The case Answer Why
1 record falls 71%, random inspections find the waste measurement gaming the target was the record, not the dumping
2 narrow win against narrow loss, groups alike before direct causation at that margin the only difference is who took office
3 worst scores get the most assistance, programmes come after reverse causation the score came first and is why the aid was sent
4 bigger transfers, more emigration confounding: the province’s poverty poverty is why the transfers went there and why people leave

Exercise 6 — Read the study

A study published in 2024 asks whether local news coverage deters theft from local government.

The author measures corruption in each of 180 municipalities as the share of audited projects in which the national audit office recorded irregularities. All the figures come from the same year. He relates that to whether the municipality’s local newspaper runs a website.

Municipalities whose newspaper is online show fewer recorded irregularities. The author has already taken each municipality’s income per head into account.

He concludes that online local news deters theft from municipal budgets.

Because income is already accounted for, “they are richer” on its own earns nothing. What still counts is saying what that control does not remove.

(a) Why might the proportion of audited projects with recorded irregularities be a misleading measure of theft? Give one reason and explain it.

(b) What else might explain why municipalities with an online newspaper have fewer recorded irregularities? Say what evidence would help the author test your alternative.

Exercise 6 — what a full-mark answer does

(a) It counts recorded irregularities — what the audit office looked for, found, and wrote down. That is detection, not theft.

Why it matters: how many are recorded depends on how thoroughly a municipality was audited and how well it keeps its books, so the same stealing can produce very different numbers. A lower count may mean less looking, or tidier files.

(b) The rival is administrative capacity. A professional administration keeps cleaner records and runs cleaner procurement — and is also the kind of place that can sustain an online newspaper.

What would test it: the same municipalities before and after their newspaper went online, against municipalities that had not yet gone online. Not proof, but it stops the comparison resting on one year’s snapshot.

Exercise 7 — Match the reading

One letter each. One option is left over.

  1. Olken, “Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality”
  2. Stokes, “Perverse Accountability”
  3. Manion, Corruption by Design
  4. Andersen, Johannesen and Rijkers, “Elite Capture of Foreign Aid”
  5. Trejo and Ley, Votes, Drugs, and Violence
  6. Dasgupta, “Hidden Fires”
  1. how officials manipulate the indicator used to judge their own performance
  2. whether what citizens believe about corruption matches how much was actually taken
  3. how machine learning can help identify suspicious public contracts
  4. how parties enforce a vote-buying bargain despite the secret ballot
  5. how the end of one-party rule reshaped criminal violence in Mexico
  6. how an independent agency reduced corruption in Hong Kong
  7. whether foreign aid is diverted into offshore bank accounts

Exercise 7 — worked

1 b · 2 d · 3 f · 4 g · 5 e · 6 a

1 Olken (b) belief against what was taken suspicion barely tracked the missing money
2 Stokes (d) enforcing a bargain it cannot see the broker guesses, then withdraws the flow
3 Manion (f) an agency outside the police credibility by design, not harsher penalties
4 Andersen et al. (g) aid into offshore accounts disbursements against haven deposits, quarter by quarter
5 Trejo and Ley (e) the end of one-party rule alternation replaced the officials the pact was made with
6 Dasgupta (a) officials and their own indicator the fires left the record, not the fields

Left over: (c) — Medina-Hernández, Kertész and Fazekas on machine learning in Mexican procurement. On the reading list; not one of the six here.

Before Thursday

  • Know the four families of measure, and what each is blind to. Half of Part A and most of Part F sit on that one table.
  • Learn the five exchanges by the test, not the gift. The same bag of groceries is three different answers depending on who gets it and what is checked.
  • For every study: what was counted, by whom, compared with what. Three questions, every time.
  • Practise the sentence. Parts D, E and F are two-thirds of the marks that are actually in play.

Thursday 3 December, in class, in Canvas. Thirty minutes, closed book, Sessions 8–13.