III. When the measure becomes the target
Question 3: can the measure be gamed?
Image: smoke over northwestern India, NASA Earth Observatory (VIIRS), 2024, public domain.
Where Punjab is
- A farming state on the Pakistan border — about 1.5% of India’s land
- Two crops a year: rice in summer, wheat in winter. The leftover rice straw is called stubble
- Its fields sit 200–300 km upwind of Delhi and send most of the farm smoke that reaches the capital each winter
Why they burn, and why nobody stopped them
- Rice is cut in October; wheat must be sown within weeks
- Burning clears a field in a day — machinery takes longer and costs more
- India’s National Green Tribunal banned it in 2015
- The ban went unenforced: Punjab’s farmers are politically powerful
The problem: how do you stop hundreds of thousands of farmers doing something fast, cheap, and already illegal?
Photo: Neil Palmer (CIAT), 2011, CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons. Source: Dasgupta (2026).
2022: the fires get a target
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N["SATELLITES SPOT THE FIRES<br/>Each day's burning fields,<br/>texted out as map points"]
V["A VILLAGE OFFICER MUST ACT<br/>Go to the field, photograph it,<br/>record a fine"]
D["A DISTRICT HEAD IS SCORED<br/>Target: fires detected<br/>down 50%"]
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One party now governed both Delhi and Punjab — it owned the smoke and the air the smoke ruined. It declared zero tolerance and turned the satellite count into a performance target.
The expectation: if a fire can be seen from space, burning stops.
Source: Dasgupta (2026). Districts were told to cut detected fires by 50% against their 2022 baseline. Roughly 8,000 village officers; officers faced suspension for repeated fires without enforcement.
The fires disappeared. Why didn’t the smoke?
By 2024 Punjab recorded 10,909 fires — about 70% below 2023, the lowest in the satellite record. The government celebrated.
PM2.5 is very fine air pollution — any particle under 2.5 thousandths of a millimetre across, smoke and soot among them. Small enough to slip past your nose and throat, into the lungs, and on into the blood.
The WHO’s guideline for a single day is 15. Delhi’s monthly average tops 200.
The fires disappeared. Why didn’t the smoke?
![Two stacked time-series panels, 2020 to 2024, aligned on the same months. The top panel, fires detected in Punjab, shows November peaks that collapse from about 64,000 in 2021 to about 6,600 in 2024. The bottom panel, PM2.5 in Delhi, shows November peaks that stay at roughly the same height throughout, 226 in 2021 and 232 in 2024.]()
Turn to your neighbour: the fires fell and the smoke did not. What could explain that?
Shaded: the Oct–Dec season the policy targeted; the smaller spring peaks fall outside it. Vertical dashed: targets begin, Sept 2022. Green dashed: WHO guideline. Redrawn from Dasgupta (2026), Fig. 2 — VIIRS and Delhi US-embassy PM2.5, read off the figure, so close but not exact. Delhi’s air has other sources too.
Satellites keep office hours
Imagine a speed camera that only switches on around lunchtime.
- A burn takes two or three hours. Light it late in the afternoon and it is cold ash before anything passes overhead again.
- So the target was detected fires. Not fires.
Schematic. Several satellites cross in the 10:30–13:30 window; the animation sends one across it. Source: Dasgupta (2026).
One field, five days apart
8 November 2021 — burning Punjab, 31.1°N 74.6°E
![True-colour satellite photograph of Punjab farmland: green irrigated fields, tan harvested ones, a village. A dense white smoke plume rises from the field inside the marked ring and drifts south-east.]()
White smoke pouring off the ringed field.
13 November 2021 — burned Same ring, same field
![The same true-colour scene five days later, from the same viewpoint. The smoke is gone and the field inside the ring, with many of its neighbours, is grey-black burned ground.]()
No fire here now. The ground is grey-black.
The flame lasts hours. The mark lasts weeks. A fire counts only if something was overhead while it burned — the scar is there whenever you look. That is how Dasgupta finds the missed fires.
True colour, as the eye would see it from orbit. Sentinel-2, 10 m per pixel, 4.6 km across. Contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data (2021) — before the targets began.
Why might officials help farmers hide?
Overpass times are published. A farmer with a few hectares does not look them up.
Enforcing meant confronting neighbours. The village fire officer lives in the village. Farmers gathered to threaten them.
The district head needed the count to fall. In the Indian civil service, postings and promotions turn on looking effective.
So there was an easier way out. Tell the farmers when the satellite passes. The count falls; nobody is confronted.
Nobody has caught an official doing this. The evidence shows the incentive, and a pattern of hidden fires that fits it.
And notice who was being measured: not the farmers, the officials.
Source: Dasgupta (2026), drawing on interviews with Punjab officials; the paper treats district head and village officers as one decision-making unit. A plausible mechanism consistent with the evidence, not a directly observed conspiracy.
Compared with what?
Suppose fires fell everywhere that year because the weather was different. How would we know Punjab’s targets did anything?
![]()
Same weather, same soils, same crops — different policy. Did fires fall in Punjab more than they fell just across the border?
For every 100 fires that vanished, about 22 really stopped
The researchers compared what the satellites detected with what the burn scars say actually happened.
Imagine 100 fires disappearing from Punjab’s official record.
Where the official decline actually went
| Really stopped — the field was not burned |
22 |
| Still burned — just not while anything was watching |
78 |
So burning really did fall — nothing like as far as the record claimed.
Dasgupta (2026), Tables 1–2: the cross-border gap in detected fires narrowed by about 100 fires per 100 sq km per season, of which about 22 were a real fall. Two estimated effects scaled to a round 100 — not a tally of individual fires.
What went wrong?
- What did the government want? Fewer fields burned.
- What did it measure? Fires a satellite happened to be overhead to see.
- What happened to the burning? It moved out of the satellite’s view.
- What did the number do? It fell by 100. The burning fell by about 22.
Goodhart’s law. When a measure becomes a target, it stops being a good measure — because now someone has a reason to move the number rather than the thing.
The anticorruption version: detecting fewer violations is not the same as there being fewer violations.
Should officials be judged by numbers?
You are in charge of Punjab’s efforts to stop farm burning. Officials need pressure to enforce the law, but numerical targets can encourage cheating. What would you do?
Option A: Keep strict targets.
- Officials must reduce the number of recorded fires.
- Without targets, they might have little incentive to enforce the law.
- The risk: They may hide fires to make their numbers look better.
Option B: Remove the targets.
- Officials are no longer rewarded for reducing a single number.
- They can focus on preventing burning rather than improving statistics.
- The risk: Without measurable targets, how do we know they are doing their jobs?
In pairs: A or B? Can you design a better system that solves both problems?
What if the government wants the numbers to look good?
In Punjab the target gave officials a reason to hide fires, and most of the apparent improvement looks like hiding. But that government did want the burning to stop.
Now drop that assumption. What if the number that flatters the government is what the government is after?
IV. When the state is the problem
Question 3 again: who controls the tool — and can data the state does not own still catch it?
Image: Utah Data Center, Swilsonmc, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons.
Can you trust a government’s report card?
A president goes on television: “The economy grew 6% last year.”
- Why say it? Growth makes a government look competent — it wins elections, calms markets and keeps rivals quiet.
- Who produced the number? A statistical agency that the same government funds, staffs and can lean on.
- So who checks it? In a democracy: opposition parties, courts, a free press. Where those are weak, challenging the official figure gets much harder.
The problem: how do you mark a government’s homework when the government marks it itself?
The 6% is invented. Every government has the incentive; what differs is whether anyone at home is able to act on it. Source: Martinez (2022).
Why would a growing economy be brighter?
GDP is the value of everything a country produces in a year — the goods on the shelves, the steel, the haircuts.
- Making more things takes more power. Factories run longer shifts, more shops and offices open, more lorries move after dark.
- Growing economies build. More houses, more roads, more street lighting.
- All of that shows from orbit. A satellite photographs the same ground every night and records how bright it is.
But light is not GDP. A farming country can produce a great deal and glow very little; efficient bulbs cut the light without cutting the output. Night lights are a clue the government does not control — not a measure of the economy.
Source: Martinez (2022), using DMSP-OLS night-time lights, 1992–2013.
Richer countries really are brighter
![Log-log scatter of night-time light per person against GDP per person for 154 countries. The cloud of points slopes clearly upward; Ethiopia and DR Congo sit bottom left, the United States top right, with Mexico, Brazil, China, India and Nigeria in between.]()
Richer countries tend to be brighter. The dots climb together almost in a line.
And here is the point: a government writes its own GDP figures. It does not write the lights.
But careful. This is rich versus poor, today. It cannot yet tell you who is exaggerating.
A number the government cannot switch off
- A government reports its own GDP. It does not run the satellite
- So line the two up: when a country’s lights brighten, how much growth does it report that year?
- Martinez does this for 184 countries, 1992–2013, comparing each country with itself over time
- The test: does the same brightening buy more reported growth in an autocracy than in a democracy?
Image: NASA Earth Observatory, VIIRS, 2012 — how brightly places are lit, not evidence that any government faked its figures. Lights proxy activity; they are not GDP. Source: Martinez (2022).
The lights and the books disagree
What have we learned?
Mexico — can an algorithm find the contracts? Yes: six times better than chance at the top of the list. It was never run as a real audit, so we do not know whether corruption fell.
India — what if the measured learn the measure? The record improved far more than the fields. Of every 100 fires that left the count, about 22 really stopped.
Autocracies — can outside data catch exaggeration? Yes, in the pattern: the same light buys more reported growth under autocracy. Catching is not stopping.
Every answer is yes, but. All three produced new information. In none of them was the information, by itself, enough.
Technology can make wrongdoing much easier to detect. Whether it makes wrongdoing rarer depends on who has the incentive and the power to act.
References
Adam, I., & Fazekas, M. (2021). Are emerging technologies helping win the fight against corruption? A review of the state of evidence. Information Economics and Policy, 57, 100950. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2021.100950
Bauhr, M., Czibik, Á., de Fine Licht, J., & Fazekas, M. (2020). Lights on the shadows of public procurement: Transparency as an antidote to corruption. Governance, 33(3), 495–523. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12432
Beraja, M., Kao, A., Yang, D. Y., & Yuchtman, N. (2023). AI-tocracy. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 138(3), 1349–1402. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjad012
Dasgupta, A. (2026). Hidden fires: Real versus measured performance in bureaucracies [Working paper]. University of California, Merced.
References (continued)
Fazekas, M., Tóth, I. J., & King, L. P. (2016). An objective corruption risk index using public procurement data. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 22(3), 369–397. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-016-9308-z
Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling corruption. University of California Press.
Martinez, L. R. (2022). How much should we trust the dictator’s GDP growth estimates? Journal of Political Economy, 130(10), 2731–2769. https://doi.org/10.1086/720458
Medina-Hernández, M., Kertész, J., & Fazekas, M. (2026). Learning from sanctioned government suppliers: A machine learning and network science approach to detecting fraud and corruption in Mexico. Scientific Reports, 16(1), 22382. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-026-48873-w