Comparative Politics

Lecture 8: Revision for Midterm

Bogdan G. Popescu

bogdan.popescu@johncabot.edu

John Cabot University

Learning Outcomes, Skills, and Themes

Introduction

Learning Outcomes of the Course (Reminder)

Engage critically with questions falling under the headings

Use the comparative method for political topics

Understand the advantages and disadvantages of different theoretical frameworks and research methodologies

Think about theoretical arguments as well as empirical testing and evidence regarding such arguments

1. Engaging Critically with Questions

We covered thought-provoking questions and analyzed political phenomena such as:

How states formed and why some remain weak
How colonial institutions persist and shape development
What democracy is and how we measure it
Why countries democratize — and why they backslide
How autocracies survive and fall

You are (should be) able to analyze these topics from multiple perspectives and have a (more informed) opinion.

2. Using the Comparative Method

We explored a variety of topics using comparative analysis. For example, we:

Compared state formation in Europe, Africa, and Latin America (Tilly, Herbst, Centeno)

Evaluated colonial legacies using cross-national and sub-national evidence (AJR, Dell, Lowes & Montero)

Compared democratic backsliding in Hungary vs. Poland (Bermeo, Levitsky & Ziblatt)

3. Understanding Pros and Cons of Theories and Methods

We investigated a variety of theoretical frameworks, including:

Modernization theory vs. credible commitment theory for democratization
Minimalist vs. maximalist definitions of democracy

We examined topics using different methodologies, such as:

Cross-national regression (AJR)
Regression discontinuity designs (Dell, Lowes & Montero)
Conjoint experiments (Svolik)

4. Considering Theoretical Arguments and Empirical Evidence

We evaluated the applicability of theoretical frameworks to real-world contexts. For example, we:

Applied Tilly’s “war made the state” thesis to Europe and tested its limits in Africa (Herbst) and Latin America (Centeno)

Used Acemoglu & Robinson’s credible commitment model to explain South Korea’s democratization and Singapore’s persistence as an autocracy

Compared Tunisia and Egypt to understand why the same shock (Arab Spring) produced different regime outcomes

Skills Gained/Enhanced

Critical Thinking: evaluated pros and cons of different theories and methodologies
Analytical Skills: learned how research questions are formulated and answered using qualitative and quantitative data
Effective Communication: articulated your ideas verbally
Cultural Awareness: examined political phenomena in various global contexts — Europe, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, East Asia

Week 2: State Formation

Week 2: What Is the State?

What is the state? (Weber, 1919)

“A human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”

Three elements:

Monopoly — force not shared with private actors
Legitimacy — accepted, not merely imposed
Territory — bounded space, not kinship

Week 2: Tilly — “War Made the State”

Charles Tilly (1985, 1990) argues state formation resulted from centuries of military competition, not from design or ideology.

Military Competition → Revenue Imperative → Extraction & Taxation → Administrative Apparatus → State Capacity
European states were at war 75% of the time, 1500–1700
~1,000 political entities in 990 CE → ~25 states by 1900

Week 2: Challenges to Tilly

Herbst (2000) — Africa: Wars existed but states did not consolidate. Why?

Low population density → rulers could not reach populations
Mobile populations → subjects could exit rather than pay taxes
Lesson: Tilly’s theory has a hidden scope condition — populations must be captive

Centeno (1997, 2002) — Latin America: Wars and settled populations, but weak states.

No preexisting bureaucratic infrastructure
Elite resistance to taxation
Lesson: War alone is insufficient; the fiscal bargain must be accepted

Week 2: Potential Questions

What are the main theories for how states came to be? Which one do you find most persuasive and why?
Why did the “war makes states” argument work in Europe but not in Africa or Latin America?

Week 3: Colonial Legacies

Week 3: The Settler Mortality Thesis

Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson’s (2001) settler mortality thesis:

High settler mortality → Europeans don’t settle → extractive institutions
Low settler mortality → Europeans settle → inclusive institutions
These institutional forms persist and explain divergent development today

Critiques:

Albouy (2012): mortality data is unreliable
Glaeser et al. (2004): settlers brought human capital, not just institutions

Week 3: Forced Labor and Long-Run Development

The Mita was a Spanish colonial forced labor system in Peru/Bolivia (1573–1812).

Using a regression discontinuity design at the Mita boundary:
- 25% lower household consumption inside vs. outside
- Effects persist 200 years after abolition

Counterintuitive finding: fewer haciendas = worse outcomes
- Mita destroyed indigenous populations → fewer workers → fewer estate owners → less lobbying for public goods

Week 3: Colonial Violence and the Erosion of Trust

Leopold II’s Congo Free State (1885–1908): private companies enforced rubber quotas through systematic violence.

Indirect rule delegitimized local authority — chiefs became agents of extraction
Using RDD at concession boundaries: lower trust, lower participation, lower wealth

Persistence channels across all three studies:

Formal institutions (AJR)
Political economy / elite representation (Dell)
Trust and behavioral norms (Lowes & Montero)

Week 3: Potential Questions

To what extent do colonial institutions explain long-run development outcomes? Discuss with reference to at least two studies covered in class.
Through what different channels do colonial institutions persist? Discuss.

Week 4: What Is Democracy?

Week 4: Defining Democracy

Schumpeter (1942): Democracy is a competitive struggle for the people’s vote — a minimalist definition.

Dahl (1971): Democracy requires two dimensions:

Contestation — can opposition compete freely?
Inclusiveness — who gets to participate?
A regime high on both dimensions is a polyarchy

Sartori (1970): The ladder of abstraction — thin definitions travel farther; thick definitions capture more. This is a tradeoff, not a right/wrong choice.

Week 4: Measuring Democracy

Three major indices:

Polity5: -10 to +10, institutional focus, longest time series (since 1800)
Freedom House: 0–100, includes civil liberties, expert assessment (since 1972)
V-Dem: 0–1, five principles, 450+ indicators, Bayesian methodology

Hungary 2018 — The disagreement problem:

Polity5: full democracy (10/10)
Freedom House: partly free (66/100)
V-Dem: electoral autocracy (0.28/1.0)

Week 4: Competitive Authoritarianism

Levitsky & Way (2002): Democratic institutions exist and are meaningful, but the playing field is fundamentally unequal.

Opposition can organize, media exists, courts function
But incumbents abuse state resources, manipulate media, harass opponents
“Competition is real but unfair”

Collier & Levitsky (1997): The problem of “democracy with adjectives” — illiberal democracy, delegative democracy, guided democracy — each subtype subtracts an attribute, risking conceptual stretching.

Week 4: Potential Questions

How should we define and measure democracy? Discuss the tradeoffs between different approaches.
Why do different democracy indices sometimes disagree on whether a country is democratic?

Week 5: Democratization

Week 5: Modernization Theory

Lipset (1959): “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.”

Economic growth → Urbanization → Education → Middle class → Political demands → Democracy

Przeworski & Limongi (1997): The critical distinction:

Endogenous: development causes transitions to democracy
Exogenous: development helps democracies survive
Democracies above $6,055 per capita never died — but does this reflect transition or survival?

Week 5: Credible Commitment

The puzzle: Why would elites voluntarily give up power?

Citizens can threaten revolution (costly but destructive)
Elites cannot credibly promise redistribution — once the threat recedes, they renege
Democracy transfers policy control permanently to the median voter — it is a credible commitment device

Equilibrium predictions:

Low inequality → status quo
High inequality → democratization (credible threat, elite concedes)
Very high inequality → revolution

Week 5: South Korea vs. Singapore

Both countries had similar profiles circa 1985: high GDP, high literacy, export-oriented economies.

South Korea: labor-intensive industry → organized workers → credible threat → democratization (1987)

Singapore: state-managed economy → no independent labor → no credible threat → elite avoided conceding

Lesson: Modernization creates conditions, not outcomes. The structure of inequality and organization determines whether the A&R mechanism fires.

Week 5: Potential Questions

Does economic development cause democratization? Discuss.
Why do some wealthy countries remain autocratic while some poor countries democratize?

Week 6: Democratic Backsliding

Week 6: What Is Democratic Backsliding?

Bermeo (2016): “State-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy.”

Modern backsliding is incremental — no single moment of death
Executive aggrandizement has replaced coups as the dominant form of reversal
All done through legal or quasi-legal channels

Week 6: Why Does Backsliding Succeed?

Svolik (2019): Partisans tolerate norm violations when the violator is on their side — electoral accountability fails under polarization

Levitsky & Ziblatt (2018): Democracies need two informal guardrails — mutual toleration and institutional forbearance — and backsliding succeeds when these erode

Scheppele (2022): Autocratic legalism — every step appears formally legal, making it hard to resist

Week 6: Hungary vs. Poland

Hungary (Orbán): Won 2/3 supermajority (2010) → new constitution → court packing → media capture → complete institutional capture. V-Dem score: 0.82 → 0.28.

Poland (PiS): Never had 2/3 majority → could not rewrite constitution → judiciary became focal point for opposition → PiS defeated in 2023 → partial recovery.

Key lesson: Electoral margin (supermajority vs. simple majority) determines the reversibility of democratic erosion.

Week 6: Potential Questions

What is democratic backsliding, and why has executive aggrandizement replaced coups as the dominant form of democratic reversal?
Compare Hungary and Poland. Why was backsliding reversible in one but not the other?

Week 7: Autocracies

Week 7: The Dictator’s Dilemma

Svolik (2012) — The dictator’s dilemma:

Power-sharing problem: Need elite cooperation but cannot credibly commit to sharing power
Control problem: Repression deters challenges but destroys information about threats

Elite defection (not popular revolution) is the decisive mechanism in regime breakdown

Week 7: Regime Types and Institutions

Geddes, Wright & Frantz (2014):

Military regimes — rule collectively; vulnerable to internal factions; tend to return to barracks
Single-party regimes — party controls leadership; vulnerable to elite splits; negotiate transitions
Personalist regimes — power in one individual; vulnerable to succession crises; collapse violently

Gandhi (2008): Autocratic institutions (legislatures, parties) are not facades — they solve real coordination problems by distributing rents and creating commitment.

Example: Mexico’s PRI rotated the presidency every 6 years, maintained power for 71 years (1929–2000)

Week 7: Linkage, Leverage, and the Arab Spring

Levitsky & Way (2010): Linkage (structural ties to the West) matters more than leverage (external pressure) in shaping autocratic outcomes.

Tunisia (2011): Small professional military, strong civil society, high linkage to Europe (75% of exports) → democratic transition.

Egypt (2011–2013): Military held ~25–40% of GDP, lower linkage (30% exports) → military removed Mubarak on its own terms → Sisi’s coup in 2013 → return to autocracy.

Lesson: Same shock, different outcomes — regime type and external linkage determine the path.

Week 7: Potential Questions

How do autocracies survive? Discuss with reference to the main theories and cases covered in class.
Why did the same shock (Arab Spring, 2011) produce democracy in Tunisia but military rule in Egypt?

The Exam

The Exam: Grading

The exam in relation to grading:

Contributions to Class 33%
Mid-term 33%
Final exam 33%

Contributions to Class (Reminder) Average of:

Presentation
Physical presence
Class participation
Questions submitted every week
Quality of questions

The Exam: Format

Format

Duration: one hour
Answer two from six questions
Write on the answer sheets provided

Grading Criteria

Criterion	Points
Answering the question	20
Empirical examples	20
Structure	20
Critical analysis	15
Definitions	10
References	10
Clarity of expression	5

Example Question and Answer

A Strong Answer

To what extent does modernization help explain why countries democratize?

Modernization theory, most associated with Lipset (1959), suggests that as countries become more economically developed, they are more likely to become and remain democratic. The mechanism runs through urbanization, education, and the emergence of a middle class that demands political participation.

However, Przeworski and Limongi (1997) challenge this by distinguishing between transition and survival: development may help democracies survive without actually causing transitions. Rich autocracies like Singapore and the UAE undermine the claim that development inevitably leads to democracy.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) offer an alternative: elites concede democracy not because of modernization per se, but when facing a credible revolutionary threat that cannot be defused by temporary promises. South Korea’s 1987 democratization fits this logic — organized labor created a credible threat — while Singapore’s state-managed economy prevented such mobilization.

In conclusion, modernization creates favorable conditions for democracy but does not determine outcomes. The structure of inequality, elite incentives, and institutional design matter at least as much as income levels.

Note: This is an idealized example — your answer does not need to be this polished to score well.

A Weak Answer

To what extent does modernization help explain why countries democratize?

Modernization theory says that when countries get richer they become more democratic. This makes sense because people who have more money want more freedom. We can see this in many countries around the world.

Some countries are rich and democratic, like the United States and France. Other countries are poor and not democratic. This shows that modernization theory is correct.

However, some people disagree with this theory. They think other things matter too. In conclusion, modernization theory is partly correct but not completely.

Why is this weak? No definitions, no specific references, vague empirical examples, no critical analysis, no counterarguments. It restates the question without demonstrating knowledge of the course material.

Criterion 1: Answering the Question (20 pts)

Question: “To what extent does modernization help explain…?”
Strong: “Modernization creates favorable conditions for democracy but does not determine outcomes.” — Takes a clear, qualified position.
Weak: “Modernization theory is partly correct but not completely.” — Vague; does not commit to a specific argument.

Criterion 2: Empirical Examples (20 pts)

Strong: Names Singapore, the UAE, and South Korea — specific countries used to support and challenge the theory
Weak: “Some countries are rich and democratic, like the United States and France” — generic examples that do not test the theory

Good empirical examples do analytical work — they support or challenge an argument, not just illustrate it.

Criterion 3: Structure (20 pts)

Strong answer structure:
1. Thesis answering the question
2. Definition of the key concept
3. Counterargument with evidence
4. Alternative theory with cases
5. Conclusion restating the position
Weak answer structure: Repeats the same point three times with no progression

A reader should be able to follow your argument paragraph by paragraph.

Criterion 4: Critical Analysis (15 pts)

Strong: Compares South Korea (democratized) and Singapore (did not) — two similar countries with different outcomes, directly testing the theory
Weak: No comparison, no tension, no challenge to the theory

Critical analysis means showing where a theory works and where it breaks down — not just saying “some people disagree.”

Criterion 5: Definitions (10 pts)

Strong: “The mechanism runs through urbanization, education, and the emergence of a middle class that demands political participation” — defines modernization theory precisely
Weak: “When countries get richer they become more democratic” — restates the label without defining the concept

Define the key terms before you analyze them. Show that you know what the theory actually claims.

Criterion 6: References (10 pts)

Strong: Cites Lipset (1959), Przeworski and Limongi (1997), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) — three distinct sources used to build the argument
Weak: No authors mentioned at all

You do not need exact page numbers, not even years (although it would help) — but name the authors and connect their arguments to your answer.

Criterion 7: Clarity of Expression (5 pts)

This criterion rewards clear, understandable writing — not perfect grammar.

I am looking for: logical sentences, readable paragraphs, coherent flow
I am not penalizing: minor grammatical errors, imperfect phrasing, or spelling mistakes
If your argument is clear to the reader, you will receive full marks here

Good Luck!